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The SPLICE systsa is designed to integrate a variety of
current and projects! NA7SU? processing and telecommun ica-
tions applications. The operation of the more than twenty
new applications systems currently under development will
increase the Navy's dependence on automated support, and
will require that the risk of operating the SPLICE data
processing environaent be evaluated and managed at an accep-
table level. This thesis identifies the requirements for
implementing a Risk Management Program, provides a formal
model for the quantification aid management of risk, and
examines contemporary technical and managerial countermea-
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A. INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT
Computers have besoms an integral part of the business
and government world by perforning many of the operations
and applications that, in the past, were either done manu-
ally or not at all. In addition to spending vast sums of
money to acguire and operate computer hardware, Navy activi-
—
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development, communication links for remote terminals and
networks, site construction and daily operating expenses,
and the administrative overhead of a data processing depart-
ment staff. More importantly, the proliferation of
computers has affected the day-to-day operations at a number
of Navy activities. Many activities depend so heavily on
their computers that if the computers ceased operation,
either the activities would fail to accomplish their mission
or they would suffer a severe degradation in their mission
effectiveness.
The introduction of automation has resulted in a
substantial increase in the risk an activity faces. For
example, the centralization of data and services is often
associated with a remote access capability. This added
capability permits interrogation and alteration of data
files with little or no check on the authenticity of the
source. Additionally, there is often a reduction in the
accessibility of visual records accompanying the shift to
automated support. In a manual system, sales ledgers,
payment books, and invoices are maintained by various
internal departments to manags and monitor an activity's
business. In a computerized system, these same records are
10

retained on magnetic storage neclia and are updated automati-
cally by a software program. rhe accuracy and authenticity
of these records has become tha joint responsibility of the
data processing department and the user, which often results
in uncertainty about the responsibility for data integrity.
The question is who is responsible for the data -- the user
who originates the input and uses the result, or the data
processing department, which has day-to-day responsibility
for the automated processing. These new risks have gener-
ated an obligation of management to protect this significant
investment and to provide for continuity of operations
should a catastrophe or accident occur. [Ref. 1: pp. 1-8]
Protection can be accomplished by designing, developing
and implementing coun termeasur es . These countermeasures,
which can be either commerically procured or developed
in-house by the activity, must prevent, minimize, or assist
the data processing environment to recover from any acci-
dental or intentional i ^authorized modification,
destruction, disclosure, or denial of service. This process
of safeguarding data processing assets is called automatic
data processing (ADP) security.
Perfect security is generally regarded as unattainable.
Therefore, the objective of a good ADP security program is
to reduce, for a reasonable cose, the probability of loss to
an acceptable level aid to provide adequate recovery in case
of loss [Ref. 2: p. 2]. A good program can only be achieved
by having t cp management ultimately responsible for the ADP
security program and by applying quantitative techniques to
determine how much protection is needed to reduce the risk
of operating to an acceptable level.
There are many approaches to help top management deter-
mine the appropriate ADP security policy. The most endorsed
approach uses risk itanagement as the tool to develop and
implement that policy. Risk management is a methodology for
11

analyzing an environment and ietsrmining ths optimal sat of
courtermea suzes needei to provide sufficient protection for
chat environment.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that "...
risk management is an element of managerial science that is
concerned with the ilentif icatioa, measurement, control, and
minimization of impact of uncertain events upon organiza-
tions that depend np:i automated operations" [Ref. 2: p. 35].
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B. REQUIREMENTS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
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tated this law: the total amount of
aintained by Federal agencies, ana the
y the increasing use of computers and
ion systems. The Act defines specific
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ally authorized and necessary and is
anner which precludes unwarranted
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intrusions upon individual privity. Ths Act requires each
agency to establish appropriate administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards to ensare the integrity and confi-
dentiality of personal information and to protect against
any anticipated threats or hazards which could result in
harm, embarrassment, i nconveniei oe, or unfairness. [Ref. 4:
p. 133]
When the Act became law on 31 December 197U, virtu-
ally every agency in the Federal government was impacted.
Because of its implementation responsibility, the Office of
Mar.aaement and Budget (OMB) was particularly affected. 0M3
responded to the Act by issuing 0M5 Circular No. A- 108,
"Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records About
Individuals by Federal Agendas," dated 1 July 1975.
Specific taskings associated with this ciroular are:
• The National Bureai of Standards (NBS) is responsible for
issuing standards and guidelines on computer and data
security
.
• The General Servioes Administration (GSAi is responsible
for revising coapiter and telecommunications procurement
policies to ensure compliance with applicable provisions
cf the Act.
• The (White House) Office of Telecommunications Policy is
responsible for reviewing Federal agency policy on inter-
connection and operational control of networks and
communication security devices. [Ref. 4: p. 19]
The Privacy Act of 1974 was the first in a series of
events during the 197D«s that focused national level atten-
tion on the value and vulnerability of Federal data
processing. Following the Act, in the spring of 1976, three
GAO reports were published that brought congressional atten-
tion to this growing ooncern and increased awareness of the
potential risks facing the Federal ADP community. Shortly
13

•thereafter, Senator Abraham Ribicoff directed the Committee
on Government Operations to oonduct a preliminary inquiry
into the problems of computer security. The Committee
subsequently issued two studies addressing the subject. The
first report reviewed soma of the major technological issues
and problems identified by SAO and provided an extensive
collection of articles written by experts in the field of
computer security [Ref. 5 ]• The follow-up report recom-
mended that OMB direct Federal agencies to put into effect
appropriate computer security controls and safeguards, that
NBS prepare physical and personnel standards for protecting
Federal ADP systems according to their sensitivity, and that
Federal agencies improve coordination of computer resource
protection efforts [Ref. 6: p. 276].
In response to these Congressional recommendations,
OME issued Transmittal Memorandum No. 1 to Circular A-7 1 in
July 1978 [Ref. 7]. In announcing this comprehensive
Federal computer security program, OMB Director James T.
Mclntyre, Jr., sail,
Ccmouter technoloay now impaots almost every facet of
American life. The protection of the technology against
unwarranted, unautiorized and illegal users is a'maior
challenge. This proaram addresses that challenge in the
Federal Community. ["Ref. 8]
The Transmittal Memorandum requires each agency
computer security program :d satisfy the following
requirement s:
• Conduct a perioiic risk analysis for each computer
installation operated either in-house or commercially.
• Assign responsibility for security to a management offi-




• establish a management control process to ensure that
appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safe-
guards are inccrpor at ei
.
• Ensure that appropriate security requirements are
included in specifications for the acquisition or opern-
tior. of computer resources.
• Establish personnel security policies for screeninq all
individuals participating in the desiqn, operation, or
maintenance of or having access to Federal computer
systems.
• Conduct periodic audits or ^valuations and recertify the
adequacy of the security safeguards of each operational
sensitive application.
• Ensure that appropriate contingency plans are developed,
maintained, and tasted to provide for continuity of oper-
ations should events disrupt normal operations. [Hef. 7:
p. 3]
Also in 1978, Presidential Directive Number 24 was
issued which transferred the functions of the White louse
Office of Telecommunications Policy tc the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of Commerce. DOD was -asked
with telecommunications policy relating to national
security. All other te leconn an ications policy functions
were assigned to the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration under the Department of Commerce.
Because DOD is the largest Federal agency in terms
of personnel strength, budget size, and nuaber of computers,
it is the most affected by tha Federal policies discussed
above. DOD reacted to OMB Circular A-108 by publishing DOD
Directive 5U00.11 [Ref. 9]. This directive established a
DOD Privacy Board with oversight review authority, and
included guidelines for safeguarding personal data in ADP
systems as an appendix. D3D approached Circular A-71
15

somewhat less decisivaiy. Sinsa DOD had been involved with
the protection of classified data for years, it sought to
apply the framework of A-71 id ths existing classified arena
and integrate the aiditionai protection requirements for
unclassified ADP systems. rhs objective of DOD was to
develop an overall systematic concept to security that
applied safeguards tD each ADP system commensurate with the
sensitivity of the data being processed. DOD forwarded the
approach to OMB in a memorandum dated 30 January 1 98 D and
appropriately entitled "A Comprehensive Information Security
Program." By the issuance of this memorandum, all military
departments were tasked to establish formal risk management
and computer security programs is delineated in Ref. 7.
In reaction to the proposed comprehensive DDD AD?
Security Program, the Department of the Navy (DON) promul-
gated OPNAVINST 5239.1, which assigned spacific ADP security
responsibilities within the Navy and established Designated
Approving Authorities (DAA). The current version of this
instruction [Ref. 10] directs aach Navy activity to assign
ADP security responsibilities, establish an Activity ADP
Security Program, implement a formal Risk. Management
Program, and be accredited by the appropriate DAA.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1 A, together with the Naval Material
Command (NAVMAT) and the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSDP) implementations, should after a period of time
substantially increase the protection afforded to DON ADP
systems. The reguirenents for a Risk Management Program are
summarized in Table I, which lists the regulations and
reports published in the last decade.
2- Ope rational Requirements
In order to establish and manage an Activity ADP
Security Program, it is encumoant on activity top management




Federal/DOD/DD N Regulations on ADP Secarity
1974 - Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579)
I^S - OMB Circular No. A-108, "Resoonsibilities for the
Maintenance of Recoris about Individuals by
Federal Agencies," 1 JuLy 1975
- DODD 5400.11, "Personal Privacy and Rights of
Individuals Regarding their Personal Records," 4
August 1975
- NAVMATINST 5211.2, "Personal Privacy Act ar.d
Rights of Individuals Regarding their Personal
Records," 26 September 1975
- NAVSOPINST 52 11.1
«,
"Personal Privacy Act and
Rights cf Individuals Regarding their Personal
Records (Privacy Act of 1974, Puolic Law 93-579) ,"
18 November 1975
1976 - GAO Report, "Improvement Nee2=i in Managing
Automated Decisionmaking by Computers Throughout
the Federal Government," April 1976
- GAO Report, "Computer-Related Crimes in Federal
Programs," April 1976
- GAO Report,, "Managers Need to Provide Better
Protection ror Federal Automatic Data Processing
Facilities," lay 1976
- Senate Committee on Government Operations,
"Computer Aoises - Problems Associated witn
Computer Technology in Federal Programs and
Private Industry," "June 1976
1977 - Senate Committee on Government Operations, "Com-
puter Security in Federal Programs," February 1977
- NAVMATINST 5510.17, "Sacurity of ADP Systems," 22
March 1977
1978 - OMB Circular No. A-71, Transmittal Memorandum No.
1, "Security of Felerai Automated Information
Systems," 2 7 July 197 3
1979 - SECNAVINST 5211.1C, "Personal Privacy and Riahts
of Individuals Pertaining to Their Personal
Records," 4 December 1931
1980 - DOD Memorandum, "A Comprehensive Information
Security Program," 30 January 1980
- NAVSUPINST 5510.6A. "Security Reguirements for ADP
Systems," 28 lay 1980
1982 - OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, "Department of the Nav




Director) to implement a Risk Management Program. In the
process of formalizing 'his program, top management must
establish ADP security policy with explicit regard to
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and the unique requirements and
constraints of the activity ADP systems. * Ref . 10: p. 1-2]
Since activities hava invested heavily in computer
resources, they oftan desire to maximize the utilization of
their resources by sharing tham among usees, both internal
and external to the activity. Each usar has a different
neec-to-kno w and naei- to-ut iliza criteria for accessing his
information. This requires that individual user data
integrity be assured, while concurrently providing shared
access to the ADP system. For example, an ADP activity
might furnish servicas to both fiscal and logistic users,
each of which expects its assats to be protected and avail-
able upon demand. The task of simultaneously sharing and
protecting an ADP system is the responsibility of the
activity providing automated support.
Ref. 10 requires that aach Navy ADP activity be
accredited for operational usa. By accrediting an activity,
the DAA, which in some cases is the activity Commanding
Officer, acknowledges that fchs risk of operating the lata
processing environment is acceptable, in light of the activ-
ity's mission and the users' dependence on automated
support, and approves the systam for operational use. To
obtain accreditation, top management must quantify the oper-
ational risk and implement an Activity ADP Security Plan.
The Risk Management Program dascribed in Ref- 10 and further
explained by this tiiasis is the *ool used by top mangement
to quantify the risk present, evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of proposed countarmeasures, and provida for
recurring review of the activity's ADP security posture.
18

C. INTRODUCTION TO SPLICE
The stock Point Logistics Integrated Commur.ica 1: ior.s
Environment (SPLICE) is a NAVSj"? Project designed to inte-
grate all interactive processing and telecommunications
required by current and projected applications systems
operating within tae Uniform Automated Data Processing
System for Stock Points (JADPS/5P) . The SPLICE Project will
use standard minicomputers and nodular software components.
A "f oreground/backgrour.d" concept will be implemented with
SPLICE minicomputers, which will serve as a front-end-
processor for tne existing stock points medium sized
Burroughs systems. "Sef. 11: p. 1]
More than twenty new applications systems under develop-
ment and the current UADPS/SP system comprise the "SPLICE
Umbrella." These systems will require considerable interac-
tive and telecommunications support at more than fifty
UADPS/S? activities. SPLICE will provida a responsive and
economical support capability without saturating the current
Burroughs mainframes, and will- simplify the eventual main-
frame replacement [Ref. 11: p. 1 ]. SPLICE will present a
user oriented environment whici will provide many standard
operating functions such as terninal management, communica-
tions management, database nanagement, and peripheral
management. Additionally, there will be nany support func-
tions such as standard software tools (compilers, etc.),
recovery management:, and security- The existing Burroughs
mainframes will provide large file processing functions and
report generation.
As seen in Figure 1.1, the evolution of computer tech-
nology has resulted in the design and implementation of very
complex and sophisticated automated environments. The risk
of operating these new environments is directly proportional
to their overall complexity. As a point of reference, the
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the technology and complexity scales. The Navy's increased
operational dependencies on automated systems demand that
the risk in SPLICE bs evaluated and managed at an acceptable
level.
D. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
Research by Naval Postgraduate School faculty and
students on the SPLICE Project is concerned with systems
analysis and preliminary design proposals for many of the
functional areas of SPLICE. Phis thesis defines a Risk
Management Program to evaluate and manage the risk associ-
ated with the operation of SPLICE. The methodology proposed
draws upon current government and industry technigues and
conforms to existing DON and ^A7S rJ? guidance.
Ref. 11 tasked NAV5UP D'4 1 5 and the Fleet Material
Support Office (FMSOj 94 with conducting a risk analysis of
the SPLICE system. It is intended that the Risk Management
Program proposed in this thesis be used as a tool to quan-
tify the risk in SPLICE. Together with information about
and simulation of tie eventual operational SPLICE activi-
ties, -his tool can oe used to identify those initial design
specifications needed to reduce the risk in SPLICE.
E. LIHITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
y. Defense Data Network
The original SPLICE specifications reguired the
Network Interface Subsystem to provide access to the AUTODIN
II Network [Ref. 13: p. 57]. On 2 April 1982 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Carlucci directed the termination of
the AUTODIN II prograa and the immediate development of the
Defense Data Network (DDN) ^Ref. 14]. It is current DOD




It is assuaei that ths SPLICE Network, will comprise
a "community of interest" within the DDN. A brief '??::ir-
tion of the DDN and a summary of the security features
provided by the DDN is included as Appendix C.
2. Level II Data
It is assumed that tha data processed within the
SPLICE Network is Laval II data, which is defined in Ref. 10
as unclassified data requiring special protection. Since
the SPLICE application systems will be processing financial
and other management lata which is by definition "Sensitive
Eusiness D at a," it requires protection for reasons other
than being classified or personal data. It is judged that
the potential impact of modification or destruction of the
data is severe enough to justify a greater degree of protec-
tion than required for other unclassified information.
3- Activity ADP Security, Plan
The majority of SPLI3E configurations will be
located at Navy ADP activitias, which ara subject to the
Department of the Na/y ADP Security Progran [Ref. 10: p. 3].
Although the proposals set forth in this thesis follow the
guidance of Ref. 10 f they are concerned only with the risk
management of the SPLICE configuration (s) and will not
constitute an Activity ADP Security Plan. The Activity ADP
Security Plan must be much more comprehensive in order to
implement the overall Activity ADP Security Program. In
particular, Appendix J of Ref. 10 outlines the mandatory
minimum requirements for DON \DP activitias. Additional
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II. OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT
A. RISK MANAGEMENT TERMINOLOGY
Before proceeding with a discussion of the functional
phases of risk management, it is essential that the terms
risk, threat, val nerability , and countermeasure be
explained.
1- Risk
In Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, risk is defined
as the possibility of loss or injury; a dangerous element;
or the degree of probability of a loss. Unfortunately, the
term risk is not a universally de-fined term. Risk is
perceived differently, depending on the circumstance or
community.
The insurance industry uses the ilea of an "insur-
able risk." A oonpany identifies both the known and
uncertain elements of operating a business and minimizes
their potential loss by buying insurance. The insuring
agent, using empirical and statistical data, sells protec-
tion to the company in the form of financial compensation
should its assets be lost. !:> determine how much risk is
involved, the agent relies on historical data, prediction
models, and business experience. Unfortunately, the
computer industry is relative!/ new and little analytical
data is available fsr assessing the areas and extent of
potential security risks.
In business economics, there are two types of risk:
speculative and pure. When a basiness invests, and there is
a degree of uncertainty as to whether that investment will
result in a gain, the risk is speculative. If the only
2U

possible outcome is either loss or no change, the risk is
classified as pure.
In the context of AD? Security, only a pare risk can
exist. Risk within the data processing coamunity is defined
as the likelihood of a loss ani the expected amount of -hat
loss with respect to the assets of an activity.
2. Threat
H. Stephen Morse of the System Development
Corporation defines a threat as any action, event, or
circumstance, the occurrence of which is likely to adversely
affect the assets of an activity. Threats exist in general
because of the unpredictability of the real world and
people. The presence of a threat does not equate to harm or
loss. For that to happen, there must be a successful attack
by a threat agent using a specific technique, methodolgy, or
spontaneous occurrence.
Threat agents are classified as natural environ-
mental factors (tornado, flood, fire, etc.), authorized
users (programmers, operators, etc.), or hostile agents
(anyone net an authorized useri . A threat agent causes a
threat to be realized by attacking the assets. The attack
can impact these assets in at most four areas: modification,
destruction, disclosure, or denial of service. Whether the
attack renders harm d: Loss to the activity is dependent
upon the threat agent successfully penetrating the existing
countermea sures ani exploiting weaknesses (vulnerabilities)
in the data processing environment.
The threats facing an activity can be a function of
its geographic location, personnel workforce, processing
mode, physical facilities, or cDnputer system configuration.
Since these elements are constantly changing, threats are














[Ref. 16: p. 174 ]
Figure 2. 1 Some Typical Threats and Their Usual Defense.
Perhaps the easiest way to understand threat is by
an example. Although the existence of threats is beyond our
control, a threat will not necessarily materialize or cause
harm. There is always the threat of a fire, but that does
not mean there will be a fire. The occurence of a fire and
the extent of damage a fire woiid cause impends in part on
25

:he weaknesses in the facility. 'he weakness, in -his cas?,
is the lack of fire prevention aeasures. Figure 2.1 shows
some typical threats and their usual defense.
3. Inlner ability
OFNAVINST 5239. U iefines a vulnerability of a
computer system as a weakness ii its physical layout, organ-
ization, procedures, hardware, or software that may be
exploited to inflict harm. As with a threat, the presence
of vulnerability does not in itself cause harm; a vulner-
ability is merely the conditioi or set of circumstances of
which The threat agent can take advantage zd inflict damage.
fRef. 10: p. A-17]
The vulnerabilities of a computer system increase
directly with its conplexity; remotely accessed resource-
sharing computer systems that allow remote jcb entry are
significantly more likely to have weaknesses than a dedi-
cated, batch-processing, stand-alone system with no remotely
located terminals. Figure 2.2 illustrates some potential
vulnerabilities of a oomputer system.
One purpose Df evaluatiig a data processing environ-
ment is to identify all vulnerabilities existing in the
facility, system, or operation. By conducting a thorough
analysis of identified weaknesses and weighing each of the
probabilities of a successful attack by a threat agent, the
vulnerabilities of the data processing environment can be
measured. Vulnerabilities, uilike threats, are generally
under the control or influence of the data processing












































**• Co ji iitermeasucg
The words :ounteri=asur35, safeguards, protective or
backup measures, and control mechanisms are often viewed as
being synonymous. A counter measure is any protective
action, device, procsiure, technique, or aechanism that when
implemented reduces the activity's vulnerability to
successful attacks. These corrective features are designed
and developed to protect the assets of an activity. The
purpose of a count ecu easure is to either reduce the prob-
ability of a successful attack or minimize the impact of an
at~ack. C cur t er it*. e a ~ 1 r - s are therefore technical cr manage -
rial mechanisms foe controlling the risk to which an
activity is exposed. Some examples are contingency plans,
backup copies of software, acoess control procedures, and
audit trails.
As shown by Figure 2.3, risk management is concerned
with the interaction among the -eras just defined. Risk is
the extent and probaoility of Idss due to the manifestations
of threats (attacks) it points of vulnerability in light of
installed count ermeasu res.
B. RISK MANAGEMENT: \ FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
Risk management with respect to computers is a new
discipline that provides giancifiable technigues for
assessing the risk of operating a computer system in light
of existing protection measures, and determining the
reguirement for additional countermeasures to protect that
system. Leading authorities in the data processing industry
are using various technigues foe analyzing risks. However,
most agree on a formal, four-phased approach to risk manage-



























Figure 2,3 Factors Df Risk Management.
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For a risk management program to effectively enforce the
ADP security policies and control the AD? security poseurs
of an activity, a total comnitment is needed from top
management. High level attention will improve the coopera-
tion across interdepartmental lines and will foster an
increased security awareness. Fop management commits itself
to a risk management program by making resource allocations
in terms of both skilled manpower and budgetary allotments
and by integrating security objectives into the existing
managerial responsibilities at all levels.
Top management is also responsible for promulgating
ociicy on the frequency and conditions for initiating the
risk analysis phase. According to Ref. 10, a risk analysis
will be conducted at least ever/ five years, or whenever in
the -judgement of top management a system configuration or
facility -change has been effected that warrants a requanti-
fication of the risk.
1« Ei.HJS Analysis
The quantification of risk is not new. As early as
the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries, noted men sucn as
Pascal, Bernoulli, and Bayes applied risk analysis
techniques to "games of caance." Risk analysis has recently
been applied to the data processing environment, expanding
the "game of chance" from computing the odds for a win to
quantifying the probability of loss or harm for a computer
system.
The purpose of conductiig a risk analysis of a data
processing environment is to quantify the damage and opera-
tional impact resulting from the successful attack by a
threat agent and the likelihood of such an attack occurring
[Ref. 17: p. 8]. The analysis produces an annual loss
expectancy (ALE) value, which is a quantitative estimate of
the potential average yearly financial loss resulting from
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any accidental or Intentional unauthorized modification,
destruction, disclosure, or denial of service. This ALE
value is a baseline for assessing the ADP security posture
of an activity.
As shown by Figure 1.1, the risk an activity faces
is directly proportional to the complexity of its data
processing environment. Because of this, top management
bases the scope and depth of the risk analysis on the
complexity of the particular environment being evaluated.
Some factors that ace pertinent to the decision are the
value of the physical facility, the value of the data (both
internally to the activity and externally to others), the
configuration of the A DP system, and the oriticaiity of the
data processing service to the activity 1 s and users'
missions.
The risk analysis technique attempts to predict
future risk exposure of an activity based on a thorough
evaluation of its assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and
existing countermeasur es. This evaluation relies heavily on
the professional experience an! technical knowledge of the
risk analysis team. For this reason, it is vital that the
team be drawn from both the lata processing department and
the users' departments in order to take advantage of their
diverse backgrounds and technical expertise. The team
members should be highly skills! professionals, whose selec-
tion will substantially influence the quality of the final
risk analysis product. Additionally, the risk analysis team
must be supported at all levels if the analysis is to accu-
rately reflect the security posture of the activity.
2. Management Decision
In this phase top management decides, based on the
risk analysis, the activity's mission, and the users' degree
of dependence on automation, if the existing countermeasures
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provide sufficient protection. 3efore making this decision,
top management revisits the risk analysis to determine if
appropriate assumptions wars made and operational
constraints were considered. The risk analysis quantified
the "current level" of risk associated with operating the
existing computer system and documented the activity's ADP
security posture. The risk analysis should be presented to
top management in such a manner that decisions can be made
in relation to the documented threats, vulnerabilities, and
cour.termea sures
.
At this jur.3t.ion, tha Risk Management Program can
follow one cf two directions, contingent on the decision of
top management. If top managaaent judges the current level
of risk as acceptable, than the Operational Continuity Phase
is entered. By progressing iirectly to that phase, top
management is explicitly acknowledging that existing control
practices and procedures ara sufficient and the current
security level is to be maintained. On the other hand, if
top manaaement decides that the current level of risk is
unacceptable, then the Risk Zontrol Phase is initiated.
This means that top management is not willing to tolarate
the risk. Before the Risk Control Phase is begun, top
mar.aqement should assign a risk control team and provide
guidance abouts thos= deficiencies of greatest concern. The
risk control team should be composed of a greater proportion
of data processing technicians chan the risk analysis team.
3- Hisk Control
The function of this phase is to propose to top
management an optimal set of countermeasures that have
proven cost-effective and technically feasible. The coun-
termeasures needed to bring the risk of operating to an
acceptable level are selected from a combination of risk
avoidance and reduction tschnigues.
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Within the iata oroceseing environment, a risk is
avoided by determinin g that a. particular ADP specification
should be abandoned, redesigned, or deferred because the
potential harm is too great to be controlled with existing
technology. Councecm easures to reduce risk fall into three
basic categories:
• Protective measures which reduce the damaging effects of
external events.
• Control measures which reduce the likelihood of unde-
tected errors or fraudulent modifications and
U"»ciat.ilOr iZ6vl uiSC.D SUITr •
• Back-up (contingency) measures which provide alternative
means for carrying on the mission of an activity subse-
quent tc an event which lisrupts normal operations.
[Ref; 18: p. 2214 1
After top management selects and approves those
measures that have the greatest potential of minimizing the
overall losses, the risk control team prioritizes them for
implementation. This phase is complete wnen top management
accepts the set of proposed additional coantermeasures and
approves their implementation plan.
**• Operational Continuity.
The Operational Continuity Phase is initiated either
after completion of the Risk Control Phase or immediately
following the Management Decision Phase. If the Risk
Control Phase was executed, resources are dedicated in this
phase to carrying oat the action plan developed for imple-
menting the approved additional countermeasures.
During this phase, tha DAA makes the technical and
managerial policy decision regarding the accreditation of
the activity. That decision is made immediately if no Risk
Control Phase was executed, or after the implementation of
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additional countermeasurss. Regardless of whether or not
additional countermea surs s are being implemented, the
process of risk management continues. This ongoing effort
is considered esseitial to preserving the ADP security
posture of the activity and includes oDntinual review,
audit, and evaluation of the lata processing environment.
This phase is terminated when it is deemed necessary to
reinitiate the Risk Analysis Phase because either a five




III. RISK MAN&SE8ENT PROGRAM
The proposed Risk Management Program furnishes a frame-
work which is tailored to tas unique aspects of the data
procsssing environaeit . The fDiindation of this program is
taken from Refs. 2 and 10 an3 the recent experiences of
industry. Quantitative techniques are used in the Risk
Analysis and Risk Control Phases. These techniques do not
utilize exact values; instead, values are scaled by orders
of magnitude. The use of relative magnitude is to accomo-
date the lack of enpiricai data, incomplete knowledge on the
future likelihood of attacks, and inconclusive proof of the
effectiveness of count ermsasures
.
As a first step ia establishing a formal Risk Management
Program, it is recommended that activity top management
implement a managerial structure which includes an ADP
Security Staff as described in Ref. 10. The activity is
directed to the Comnander, Naval Data Automation Command
(COMNAVDAC) for technical assistance in conducting a risk
analysis. Within the DDH, C3MNAVDAC is responsible for
providing assistance as requested and with ensuring that
risk management expertise is shared across activity
boundaries.
This chapter i= broken into the phases of a Risk
Management Program and is intended to meet two objectives.
The first is to describe in a cohesive manner the philosophy
of each phase. The second is to give, where necessary,





According to Rsf. 10, th^re are three distinct steps in









Figure 3.1 The Major Steps of Risk Analysis.
be completed in sequential order. The purpose of the Risk
Analysis Phase, is to quantify in accordance with the policy
guidelines from top management the risks of a specific data
processing environment in relation to its threats, vainer-
abilities, and existing coini: ermeasures. The following
conceptual model and implementation considerations elaborate




jJi g risk analysis model is an abstr^cticn of "the
risk analysis process prasentei in Appendix E of Ref. 10.
It takes into account the work of Robert H. Courtney
[Ref- 3], NBS [Ref. 17], and Jerry Fitzgerald [Ref. 19].
The model allows one to systematically quantify asset losses
and attack frequencias oa an annualized basis and to calcu-
late from these tha total annual loss expectancy (ALE) of an
activity.
a. Asset Loss Determination
This step identifies all of the assets within an
activity and quantifias the activity's loss should they be
harmed. The degre? to »hich assets should be separately
identified is addressed in tha implementation considera-
tions. In addition to naming an asset, a textual
descriotion is written to dDcamer.t hew that named asset
could be impacted by threats i.i general, Next, each
named asset, fcur loss values ire determined, one for each
threat impact area. The four threat impact areas are modi-
fication, destruction, disclosure, and denial of service.
Each loss value is an estimation in dollars of what an
activity will lose if one attack is completely successful in
causing harm in that impact area to the asset. Put another
way, given that there is a ons hundred percent probability
of one successful attack, how much is an activity willing to
pay to prevent that attack? This step is completed by
transforming each loss determination into a loss rating
[Ref. 17: p. 10]. The modeL component representing this




Asset Loss Deternination Model
The loss detsrmin ^tian function, L(i,A), is an
empirical estimation of loss, in dollars, of asset
A in impact area i r rounied to the nearest expo-
nential value of ten.
The function is expressed as:
L(i,A) = function [D(A), N(A)], rounded
Where:
i = the threat impact area (modification, des-
truction, uis3i.03ir; f cr d£niaj. di service)
A = the uniqie name of an asset
D (A) = the description of iow asset A could be af-
fected by threats
N(A) = the number of identical assets A subject to
the same threats
The loss rating function is a logarithmic mapping
from L (i,A) onto an ordinal integer eoale ranging
from to 8. Tie zero ratine indicates asset A is
not affected in i particular " impact area i.
LOSS (i, A) = log
i;j
[L(i,A) ]
b. Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation
This step identifies each threat which could
possibly affect the assets of in activity, provides perti-
nent textual descriptions, aid expresses the probability of
an attack with an annualized frequency rating. The first
description defines the threat and enamerates specific
threat agents. The eeconi description discusses the vulner-
abilities which are susceptible to attacks by threat agents.
The last description describes existing countermeasures
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installed tc counter those attacks. Examples of threats
commom to the current minicpipater environment are iienti-
fied in the implementation consi Orations.
Since the realization of a threat can have an
impact assets in four areas, four frequency occurrences must
be estimated. The frequency occurrence represents, on an
annualized basis, how often a threat agent can be expected
to penetrate the defenses of an activity and successfully
attack assets. This step concludes by transforming the
frequency occurrence for each impact area into a frequency
of successful attack rating [Ref. 17: p. 10]. The model
component for this sts p is summarized in Table III.
c. Computation of the Total Annual Loss Expectancy
(ALE)
The final step of the risk analysis calculates
the activity's Total !\LE by a series cf computations. The
Total ALE quantifies the average yearly risk exposure in
dollars resulting from modification, destruction, disclo-
sure, or denial of service. The activity's risk exposure
reveals the degree to which tha existing vulnerabilities
permit threats to be realized against the assets of the lata
processing environment. The first computation uses a matrix
of all assets and threats for each impact area. An ale
(uncapitalized) is computed for each combination of loss
rating (of a single asset) and frequency cf successful
attack rating (of a single threat) paired by the same impact
area [Ref. 17: p. 10]. This ale is the risk exposure for
that specific asset and threat intersection. The second
computation computes the ALE foe impact area i as the sum of
all ale's in impact area i. The last computation totals the
four impact area ALEs . The ino3el component for this last




Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation Model
The freauency occurrence function, F(i,T) r is
a stochastic estimate of the frequency per year
of successful attack by threat T in impact area i.
The function is expressed is:
F(i,T) = function [D(T), V(T), C (T) ]
Where:
i = the threat impact area (modification, des-
truction, disclosure, or denial of service)
T = the uniquely named threat
D (T) = the definition of threat T aid listing of
of specific threat agents
V (T) = the discission of tae vulnerabilities which
allow threat T to materialize
C (T) = the description of :he existing countermea-
sures to oounter threat T
The frequency of successful attack, rating is a
mathematical maoping from F(i,T) onto an ordinal
integer scale iranaing from to 3. The zero
rating indicates "Hat threat T dees not affect anv
of the activity's assets in a particular impact
area i. After the ratiag is computed,' it is
rounded to the nearest integer.
The function is expressed as:
ATTACK (i,T) = log [3000 x F(i,T)], rounded
2- Imp_ le mentation Considerations
Top management begins this phase by selecting the
risk analysis team aid providing them policy guidance on the
scope and depth of the risk analysis. The members are
assigned in writing and their accompanying duties and
responsibilities are documented. Team selection is based




Activity Total &LE Computation
The individual "ale" function is a ma -a statical
mapping from L035 (i,A) and ATTACK (i f I) onto the
the annual loss expectancy, in dollars, associated
with each combination of asset A ana threat T,
having the same impart area, i.
The function is expressed is:
ale(i,A,T) =
1/3 * 10 exp *LOSS(i,A) + ATTACK(i,T) - 3]
The A. L E function, bv imnaot area i is a summation
of the "aie"s co rnputed" aoD ve and is expressed as:
I ) ale(i,A,T) !
v a vt
The activitv Total ME function is a total of the
four impact'area. ALEs and is expressed as:
Activity Total ME = /. , M«E (i)
Vi
talents, but also oa familarity with the activity's mission
and knowledge of the data processing services provided.
The scope and depth of the risk analysis depends on
the complexity of the data processing environment. The
SPLICE Network, as previously described in Section I.e.,
will be a decentralized, interactive, telecommunications
environment. Risk increases in direct proportion to the
complexity of the data processing environment. The SPLICE
falls on the high end of the complexity scale as seen if
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Figure 1.1. It is because of this potentially larce risk
exposure that the policy guidance concerning the risk
analysis should at the least address the following.
The risk analysis conducted during the developmental
phase of SPLICE will be different from the analysis
conducted after the system is operational. The risk in the
developmental phase is quantified either by simulating the
operational environment oc by comparing the eventual opera-
tion to one already in existence. The analysis of the
developmental phase daais with educated estimates and design
tiire considerations* while the i n^l vsis of the operational
system deals with concrete data and mission-essen tial
requirements. Since a risk anilysis is required early in a
system's life cycle, hardware and software counter measures
can.be included in the final specifications and implemented
at a reasonable cost. If the risk is not evaluated until
the operational stage, many technically feasible counter mea-
sures are nc longer practicable and less effective control
measures are used to lanage the risk.
As stated earler, a risk analysis is reinitiated
either after five years or whenever the data processing
environment has been affected by a significant change. Due
to this recurring cycle, policy guidance is needed on the
applicability of a previous rislc analysis. Host of industry
agrees that if five years has passed, then the risk should
be thoroughly reexaaiaed and documented. Dn the other hand,
if only one area has realized i major change and less than
five years has passed, then only that portion of the envi-
ronment should be reevaluated. During the reevaluat ion, the
risk analysis team is cautioned not to overlook those areas
indirectly impacted by the change.
The final area requiring policy guidance concerns
the level of detail required to document the estimated loss
expectancies and frequency occurrences. The degree of
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granularity impose! by top management directiy correlates to
the time and resources required to conduct an activity risk
analysis. The level of detail should be sufficient enough
for the risk analysis to be judged credible and defensible.
Having discassed the policy areas requiring the
attention of top management, it is now tine to focus on the
practical considerations of actually conducting a risk
analysis. The guidelines proviied in the next two sections
are general rules of thumb synoosized from Befs. 10, 33, 20,
and 21. Ref. 10, Appendix E contains the forms required by
the DON for documenting an activity's risk analysis.
a. Asset Identification and Loss Expectancy
Assets which function as a single unit or appli-
cation are identified as a whole asset, since all of its
components must be working foe the asset to be serviceable.
Likewise, if any component is damaged, the entire asset
should be equally as likely to saffer the same damage as the
component. Asset identification proceeds by reviewing the
bread resource categories listed in Table V and by ailing
additional assets that are unique to the activity. The
current DON guidance states:
For each asset defined, all component
should be in the same phyiscal area.
same manner, and subject to damage by t
consider six identical c
beoause damage to one o
all of them. Dn the ot
csnputer ae a collect
of these components wer



































The level of disaggregation and the method for
determining the loss associated with each asset are two
areas which must be standardized to minimize individual




Asset Examples Identified by Resource Category
Categories
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plies and auxiliary powe
guidelines on the appropriate level of disaggregation that
can serve as standards are as follows.
• All information required to perform i single function
should be grouped accordingly at that functional level.
This is because only partial information is net suffi-
cient for performing the application. For example, the
master and transaction files of a payroll system must
both be available to issue paychecks. This same
reasoning applies to the other soft asset categories cf
'4 5

software and administrative locuments and procedures* An
operating systen us many conponents such as a job sched-
uler, main memory manager, I/O supervisor, and ethers,
which must all be operable to perform the task of
managing the overall system. To consider each component
as a separate asset would be incorrect because thay all
act as a single unit.
• The unique identification of fixed assets is somewhat
easier as their physical boundaries are visually recogni-
zable. Fixed asssts includs the categories of hardware,
communication, and physical assets of an activity, and
are usually controlled by aerial numbers and custody
cards. As with soft assets, fixed assets are grouped
according to whether "hey act as a single unit. For
example, the operator consols of a conputer system must
'be functioning, otherwise the computer system is inoper-
able. On the other hand, if one tape drive in an
inventory of six starts to nalfunction, only that tape
drive is affected, not all o£ them.
• For the remaining asset category of personnel, no
universal grouping method exists. Each activity must
decide based apoi their particular situation which
grouping alternative is best. Some potential alterna-
tives are by skills, experience, salary, department
assigned, or job ol assi ficati on.
Determining the Loss of an asset requires
careful attention to how essential it is in supporting the
mission and how much an activity will lose if it is damaged.
The user expresses how essential an asset is by assigning it
a criticali ty value that reflects the importance given' to
the utilization of that asset. As expected, it is not an
easy decision, and once made should be reviewed and approved
by all levels of management relying on that asset.
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For fixed assets, bhe loss value for modifica-
tion and destruction damage is determined by the repair
cost, original cost, :: raplacensnt cost. Addit icr.aiiy for
destruction, the loss value Includes the cost of doing
without that asset. For disclosure damage, the user quanti-
fies the loss by determining the worth of the asset to
someone else, such as a hostile agent (any unauthorized
user). The remaining area of denial of service is much
harder to quantify. One must envision a ty_pical timeframe
during which the asset would be unavailable to satisfy the
user's demand for processing and estimate the maximum time
period that is tolerable for the user to be without the
service of that asset. Then, using these two timeframes,
one determines the estimated cost of getting that service
from a commerical timesharing company, realizing that the
user with the shortest tolerable time period has the most
critical need for service.
The soft assets of information, software, and
administrative documeits and procedures are subject to the
same four areas of damage (modification, destruction,
disclosure, and deiial of service) as fixed assets.
However, in determining their loss values for modification
and destruction, a different approach is taken. Some soft
assets of an activity are generated by an internal project
team or created uniquely for a particular function of the
activity. This means that if such an asset is destroyed,
the loss value is estimated by the cost of recreating the
asset and of doing without it. For modification damage, the
loss value is determined by either revalidating all the
files or recertifying the administrative documents and
procedures. To quantify the damage resulting from disclo-




The issue of quantifying ths loss value of
assets for which thece are replacement spaces or duplicate
copies needs clarif ication . If a terminal is destroyed for
which there is a space, then the loss due to destruction is
only the terminal's ceplacement and installation cost and
does not include the cost of not having the service avail-
able. If no spare is avaiLable, then the loss from
destruction includes all three oosts. Likewise, some soft
assets, such as centrally designed software or off-the-shelf
documentation, are easily replaced from another activity or
commerical vendor. For example, if an application system
for which there is a duplicate copy is modified or
destroyed, then the loss value only includes the overhead
and computer running time neeiei to install the backup. The
point is that the Idss value of assets foe which there are
replacements must onLy ceflect the cost to install the
backup and replace it. That oost might include the addi-
tional costs tc being the backup version into operational
use.
When quantifying tie loss value of personnel,
one takes into consideration the availability of qualified
personnel, whether unique training or knowledge is required,
and the activity's ability to absorb the loss based on the
current number of skilled personnel.
In summacy, the importance of this step cannot
be overemphasized since the lata collected dramatically
affects the analysis. The implementation considerations
presented should be viewed a5 a baseline for the risk
analysis team. Many additional constraints and guidelines




b. Threat ani Vulnerability Evaluation
In the previous section, guidance was given on
quantifying the loss expectancy of assets. This section
addresses the opposite siie of that task: how an activity
identifies the potential problems and hazards of running a
data processing environment.
The risk analysis team begins by marking those
assets critical to the activity* s mission and adding those
additional ones which might be very attractive to someone
external to the activity. Someone may want the asset
because of what couii oe gainel by corrupting its internal
contends, learning its function or meaning, or denying the
activity possession.
With the assets just marked in mind, the team
th'en considers all the potental threats that, if realized,
could inflict damage. One starts by considering the
possible adversaries that wouli take advantage cf any oppor-
tunity to attack tie activity. Basically, this means
listing the most likely threat agents (natural environmental
factors, authorized jsers, ani hostile agents) and specu-
lating on how they could aurt ths activity.
To complete this review, it is prudent to ask
where might each attack occur, such as at the computer main-
frame, remote terminal, programming office, or tape library.
Additionally, one should ask when might it happen: during
normal working hours, on holidays, just after a shift
change, or during an emergency such as a system crash, power
failure, or fire. 3y doing this additional review, poten-
tial threat scenarios can be documented and evaluated.
Having listed every plausible threat scenario,
the team determines how the potential attacks could harm the
activity. This refers back to the four treat impact areas
of modification, destructon, disclosure, and denial of
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service. In addition to determining the impact area, ar.
evaluation is mads ooncerning i3» often a threat might be
perpetrated. This evaluation i:cour.is for the probability
of each scenario occurring, given the existing ADP security
posture of the activity.
In summary, one identifies threats by consid-
ering those threats that:
• have been known to o:cur at the activity in the past:
machine failure, theft, systsm crashes, information loss
and vandalism;
• might occur witti sens reasonable probability in the
geographic area: fire, earthquake, and flood; and
• could result froa aocidsnt al or intantial errors of
humans. [Ref. 22: p. 32]
As a starting point, some threats which are
common to the current data prorsssing environment have been
listed in Table VI. Additionally, the impact area(s) asso-
ciated with the realization of sach threat is (are) marked
accordingly. The samples are a representative sampling
which the risk analysis team oan use as a checklist of
potential threat areas. For a itore exhaustive threat evalu-
ation the reader is sneouragsd to read Martin (1973), N3S
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In this phase of the Risk Management Program, activity
top management judges whsther the level of risk attributed
to the data processing environment is acceptable.
Before making that judgement, top management appraises
the risk analysis. This appraisal includes conducting a
sensitivity analysis on the data used to substantiate the
Total ALE and evaluating the technical merits of the overall
analysis effort. The sensitivity analysis determines what
effects changes in the estimated data can have on the Total
ALE. The technical merits can be evaluated by asking the
following types of questions.
• Did the users participate is estimating the loss expec-
tancy of assets?
• Was the risk analysis team adequately skilled and experi-
enced to make the appropriate assumptions?
• Are the results realistic and defensible?
• Can the results be replicated by another team?
• Were the calculations perforied correctly?
• Were the existing count ermeasires sufficiently considered
in the analysis?
• Did the risk analysis team adequately consider the activ-
ity's mission and users' dependence on automated support?
If the results of the risk analysis are not acceptable,
top management identifies the deficiencies in the analysis
and reinitiates the Risk Analysis Phase. If the results are
acceptable, top management approves the risk analysis.
After the risk analysis is approved, top management
determines whether all mandatory counterneasures have been
implemented. This is done by comparing the list of manda-
tory count ermeasures with th= existing ones documented
during step 2 of the risk analysis.
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Top management n:xt evaluates the Total ALE. The deci-
sion of whether ttia Total ME is acceptable depends
exclusively on the amount of risk that top management is
willing to assume, given the activity's mission and users 1
dependence on automated support. Many judge the level of
risk as acceptable when the loss per year is so small that
the activity*s overall mission is not significantly degraded
if threats are realizad. Sines each activity has a unique
combination of assets, vulnerabilities, personnel, and
security policies that establishes its data processing envi-
ronment, no universally accepted ALE is appropriate for all
activities. [ Ref• 23: p. 2
]
The pertinent decisions relative to this phase are
modeled by the decision tabia in Table VII. The table is
divided intc two block s (conditions and actions). The deci-
sion table is read by IF condition 1 AND condition 2 AND
condition 3 are trua, THEN tats the action marked. When
evaluating each condition listed, note that the column
entries indicate the conditional states of satisfied (T)
,
not satisfied (F) , or has no bearing (-) . The action block
lists each decision relevant to the various conditional
states. The action column entry "X" indicates the action to
be taken while a blank implies no action required.
C. RISK CONTROL
1. Model
The Risk Control Phase is concerned with selecting
additional countermsa suras to improve the overall ADP
security posture of the activity, Countermeasures are
selected which reduce the fragiency cf particular threats,
minimize the loss axpectancy associated with particular
assets, or provide an alternative means of automated
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process, in which steps 2 and 3 of the Risk Analysis Model
are repeated until the projected Total ALE is reduced to an
acceptable level. This process is executed iteratively in
order to ensure that the set of selected oounter measure s is
the optimal set.
There are se/eral constraints affecting the process
of countermeasure selection. The most significant
constraint is the required selection of countermeasures
which are designated mandatory by higher authority and must
be implemented regardless of any other criteria. Higher
authority is defined as the Designated Approving Authority
and the organizational chain of command in the DON.
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The second constraint is that each countermea sure
should provide a positive return on investment. That is,
the reduction in Total ALE (an annualized figure) as a
result of the impleiantation of a countermeasure must be
greater than the annualized cost of the countermeasure. The
ammortized cost of the countermeasure is computed as the
annual operating cost plus the annual portion of the one-
time costs associated with that countermeasure. The annual
portion of the one-time costs is the sum of the development,
implementation, and/or installation costs, divided by the
number of years in the anticipated life of the
countermea s ure.
The four stsp model of the risk control phase is
presented in Table VIII, and described in more detail in
Appendix E of Ref. 13. Step on= is the examination of those
countermeasures mandated by higher authority. Those coun-
termeasures are placed at the top of the priority list for
implementation. If the projected Total ALE with the manda-
tory countermeasures, is less than or equal to the maximum
acceptable Total ALE, the Risk Control Phase is completed.
If the projected Total ALE after implementation of
mandatory countermeasures is still not acceptable, addi-
tional countermeasures must be selected for implementation.
The selection begins by finding the countermeasure which has
the greatest potential cf lowering the projected Total ALE.
The process of selecting the aext best countermeasure is
repeated until the projected Total ALE is reduced to an
acceptable level. The process is iterative because the
amount of reduction associated with each countermeasure is
dependent on the other countermeasures previously evaluated.
This anomaly is similar to the "law of diuinishing returns"







Choose C1 through 3 j so that
TALE(E + M + C1 + + Cj) < MATALE
By:
1. Survey all mandatory sountermeasures.
If TALS(E M) < MAI&LE, go to step 5.
2. Choose countermeasure C1 such that:
TALE (E M + C1 ) is minimized, and
TALE (E + M) - TALE( E + H C1) > Cos" (CI).
If TALE(E H C1) < MATALE, go to step 5.
3. Choose another countermeasure, Cj, such that:
TALE (E M C1 ...« Cj) is minimized, and
TALE (E + 3 + C1 ... <• Ci) -
TALE (E M + 31 + ...+ Cj) > Cost(Cj).
If TALE(E * M * C1 Cj) < 3ATALE,
go to step 5.
4. Repeat stap 3 until:
TALE(E + S + C1 + ... Cj) < MATALE.
5. Develop Plan of Action for implementation of
necessary* countermei sures.
Where:
TALE (E + M) = Projected Total ALE with existing
and mandatory countermeasures (annual)
MATALE = Maximum acceptable Total ALE
Cost(Cj) = Ammcrtized oost of counter measure Cj
TALE(E M + C1 + ... Cj) = Projected Total ALE
with existing coui termeasures, mandatory
count ern easures, and proposed countermea-
sures 1 through j
* Necessary means mandatory and additional
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Finally, the optimal set of countermeasures is
prioritized and scheduled for implementation. Top manage-
ment is responsible for approving that recommended set of
additional counteme asures and their implementation
schedule. Those considerations addressing prioritization
are provided in the following section.
2« IroR^lSIltatiori Considerations
The objective of the Risk Control Phase is to
provide an approvei, prioritized optimal set of countermea-
sures which, when implemented, lower the Total ALE of an
activity to an acceptable level. The task is not a simple
one, and requires that management devote adequate resources
in both expert manpower and time to accomplish it. Several
considerations must be made during the selection of counter-
measures for presentation to naaagement.
The first consideration, as discussed above, is the
selection of those z ount ermeas ur es which are designated
mandatory by high authority. Tie SPLICE network and indivi-
dual SPLICE locations are required to implement those
countermeasure s listed in Appendix J of DPNAVINST 5239. 1A
[Ref. 10] and NAVSUPINSI 5510. 5A [ Ref . 15]. Additional
mandatory countermeasures may be identified in future revi-
sions of the SPLICE Security and Risk Analysis Plan
[Ref, 11].
The second consideration concerns the cost-
effectiveness of eaca counter nea sure. To be a candidate for
selection, a countermeasure must have a postive return on
investment. That is, the benefit realized by implementing
the countermeasure must be greater than the ammortized cost
of the countermeasure.
The final consideration in compiling a set of candi-
date countermeasures concerns the feasibility of each
countermeasure. Those countermeasures which the risk
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control team judges ir.feasible due to such things as
geographic location or technical limitations should be docu-
mented as "considered , but judged infesible." Thorough
documentation and naaagemant participation is crucial during
this feasibility review to adequately address activity
budgetary constraints. For those countermeasures judged
feasible and practical, top management initiates the appro-
priate planning and budgeting support needed for their
implementat ion.
To ensure that the optirai sex. of countermeasure s is
proposed, the risk control tean analyzes the results of the
risk analysis froii several perspectives. The matrix of
assets and threats is exarainel to identify those threats
with the greatest potential for harm, in terms of their
threat frequencies. Specific countermeasures should be
considered which reiice the likelihood of those threats
occurring.
Additionally, the team reviews the matrix to iden-
tify those assets with high loss expectancies. It is
important to recall at this point that the loss associated
with an asset is not limited to the replacement value of
that asset, but is often compounded with the value of the
service that the asset proviies. Those countermeasures
which minimize the loss expectancies associated with assets
should be considered for i mplenentation.
Finally, a global inspection of the risk analysis
must be taken. During this inspection, top management
relies on the technical expertise of the risk control team
to "read between the lines" of the asset/threat matrix and
to identify those vulnerabilities that allow a variety of
threats to materialize. The forms required for the evalua-
tion of countermeasures are provided in Ref. 10.
58

As explained in the Risk Control Model, proposed
countermeasures are selected in an iterative process.
Countermeasures are normally targeted to reduce the vulner-
abilities of an activity and, when implemented, usually
affect multiple vulnerabilities simultaneously. Due to this
overlapping result, the effectiveness of a countermeasure
must be evaluated witti respect to the entire data processing
environment before determining the total benefit that could
be realized. Additionally, the implementation of a counter-
measure could in sone situations generate a more serious
vulnerability than that whioh the countermeasure was
intended to correct. In this situation, activity top
management must decile if the benefit gained outweighs the
weakness created. For example, a recommended software coun-
termeasure might reguire multiple, lengthy passwords to
improve access control. Unfortunately, passwords of this
nature are often written down and taped to terminals,
thereby negating the effectiveness of passwords and creating
a greater vulnerability.
When the projected Total ALE with the additional
countermeasures considered is less than the maximum Total
ALE acceptable, the selection of countermeasures is
completed. The next task of the risk control team is to
develop a plan of action for implementing the set of
selected countermeasures. The development of this plan will
be guided by the availability and timing of those resources
reguired for countermeasure implementation. When the set of
proposed countermeasures and the implementation plan is
approved by top management, the Risk Control Phase is
completed.
Recent ADP security literature provides documenta-
tion on a variety of countermeasures. A discussion of many





Like the Management Decision Phase, the Operational
Continuity Phase is modeled by a decision table. The table
is applicable at any time during the phase, which can be as
long as five years. Since the Risk Management Program
requires continual rsview of the ADP security posture of the
activity, the decision table should be consulted on a
continual basis.
Some elements of the decision table, which is given
in Table IX, deserve a rnplif ication . When an activity enters
the Operational Continuity Phas=, a request for accredita-
tion is immediately forwarded tD the DAA. If the activity
has no countermeasures which must implemented, this initial
request can also be considered a final request. If neces-
sary countermeasures are to be implemented, then a final
accreditation request will be sibmitted when their implemen-
tation is completed.
According to Ref- 13, an activity must conduct a
risk analysis and be accredited every five years or whenever
there is a significant change in the system configuration or
facility. Therefore, a "Not satisfied" (F) in either of
these conditions regnires initiation of the Pisk Analysis
Phase, regardless of any other conditions. Finally, since
the Operational Continuity Phase can be entered from either
the Management Decision Phase or the Risk Control Phase, a
likelihood exists that the imols n enration of countermeasures
is happening simultaneously witi the daily operation of the
activity. The responsibilities and authorizations needed to
implement the necessary counternea sures is addressed in the
Implementation Considerations. When the Plan of Action for
implementing the necessary countermeasures is completed, a
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2« Imp lementatioa Considerations
When this phase is entered, activity top management
has approved the results of the Risk Analysis Phase, and, if
the Risk Control Phase was execited, has approved a list of
necessary countermeas ures and their implementation plan.
This review and approval docja=n t ation is submitted to the
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DAA in support of an initial request for accreditation.
Opon receipt of the request, the DAA will issue an activity
accreditation that assigns each ADP system of the activity
to one of the following three categories:
• ADP systems for which all cost-ef fective counter measures
have been implemented,
• ADP systems with an acceptable projected level of risk,
but with some count ermeasurss not yet implemented (these
systems will be granted an interim authority to operate
pending implementation completion), and
• ADP systems with a unacceptable level of risk, which
requires that operations cease until corrective measures
have been implemented. [Ref. 10: pp 3-2, 3-3]
As previously stated, the Operational Continuity
Phase includes implementing tie countermeasures approved
during the Risk Control Phase (if any) and conducting an
ongoing audit and security inspection of the activity ADP
security posture. Dne individual must, be assigned these
responsibilities and given appropriate authority and
resources to execute them. That person is designated the
Activity ADP Security Officer and is the head of the ADP
Security Staff. The responsibilities of both the ADP
Security Officer and the staff are presented in detail in
Chapter 2 of Ref. 10.
During the implementation of necessary countermea-
sures, the Plan of Action may require adjustments. To allow
for this, there must be a responsive two-way communication
between the ADP Security Officer and top management about
real world considerations and constraints. Some reasons for
modification might be unforeseen budgetary changes cr
required implementation of a as* directed mandatory counter-
measure. Additionally, the plan shoull be "tweaked" to
minimize the disruption of daily operations.
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When all necessary count ermeasures have been imple-
mented and a reguest for final accreditation has been
submitted, the DAA evaluates the effectiveness of the new
countermea sures by means of a Security Test and Evaluation
(ST5E) [Ref. 10: p. 3-6]. After the STSE, the DAA responds
to the accreditation request by assigning each ADP systems
to one of the three categories liscussed above.
The Operational Continuity Phase is terminated when
policy dictates that another risk analysis is required. At
a minimum, the Risk Analysis P^iase will be r eir.itiated when
in the opinion of tap manageneit there has been a signifi-
cant change to the configuration (hardware or software) or
facility, or when there has beei a lapse of five years since
the last approved risk analysis.
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IV. TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL COUNTERMEASORES
As stated previously, the current data processing envi-
ronment is viewed as a collection of assets. To protect
these assets, various technical and managerial security
mechanisms are implenented. Technical countermeasures are
those internal hardware, software, and communication projec-
tion mechanisms that are peculiar to the &DP system and are
best addressed in the overall system design specifications.
Managerial, also called conventional, countermeasures are
these administrative, personnel, and physical mechanisms
that are commonly required for the protection of any envi-
ronment, automated or not. Managerial countermeasures are
implemented throughout the system's life cycle and are often
used to enhance the effectiveness of technical
countermea sures
.
The ADP security policies which industry enforces
through the implementation of technical anl managerial coun-
termeasures are:
• all users and devices requira positive unique identifica-
tion and verification (authentication).
• all interactions involving asers, de/ices, and other
named system elements will be controlled by an authoriza-
tion strategy (access control) .
• all activity within the AD? system should be observed so
that users (authorized or not) can be detected and held
accountable for their actions (surveillance).
• all elements of the ADP system will function in a cohe-
sive, identifiable, predictable, and reliable manner so




The countermeasuira s discussed in this chapter are organ-
ized by the four ADP security policies presented above. The
countermeas ures are iDt identified specifically as technical
or managerial because a combination of both is required to
enforce an adequate P. DP security policy. For example, the
authentication policy is often achieved by implementing
passwords. For passwords to be effective, they require a
software mechanism to accept ani recognize passwords and an
administrative control to properly distribute and audit
their usage.
A. AUTHENTICATION
Authentication counte rmeasures prohibit the use of
system resources by unauthorized users cr devices by
verifying the unique identity of the user or device before
servicing a request.
1- U§e_I Authentication
User authentication is essentially a two-step proce-
dure of identity definition and identity verification. In
the first step, the user provides his or her user identifi-
cation number and password during initial log-on to the
system. In the second step, the system performs a table
lookup and verifies that the password provided correctly
maps to the user identification number. Additionally,
administrative controls ensure that each identification
number/password combination is assigned to only one user,
and that the user has not provided his or her unique number
and password combination to someone else.
User authentication can be performed to some extent
at the physical security level by such controls as: guards
stationed at physical entry points, personnel
sign- in/sign-out logbooks, and closed-circuit monitors.

These physical security counter measures are not sufficient
at the ADP system leval, particularly if the system supports
remote terminals or network communications. As an example,
when a user submits a batch job to the data processing
center in person, his or her identity can be verified. When
that same batch job Is submitted from a remote terminal, the
user's identity is no longer assured.
There are three methods for verifying a user's iden-
tity. These methois, which can be applied singly or in
combination, are basai on:
• something the person knows (e.g., a password, a combina-
tion to a lock, or a fact about the user's personal
background) ;
• something the parson has (a.g., a badge, a key to a lock,
or a card with machine readable information) ; or
• something the person is (a.g., his or her signature,
speech, hand geomatry, or fiagerprints) . [Ref. 24: pp.
8-10]
Several comma rcially developed devices for recog-
nizing personal attributes such as fingerprints or hand
geometry are available. However, the cost of implementing
such count ermeasures make them impractical for most decen-
tralized data processing environments lika the SPLICE
Network. The practicality of their implementation depends
on the cost of the cDuntermeasur e in relation to the amount
of protection needea to lessen the activity's potential
losses.
The most widely accepted countermeasure for
enforcing an authentication policy is the assignment of a
unique user identification numDer and password. The user
number is entered via a badge :r card, or entered from a
keyboard, whereas the passworl is generally entered only
from a keyboard. la addition to its use in authentication,
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the user's identification number is also used in maintaining
a journal of his or her activities. Passwords, unfortu-
nately, have many potentially damaging vulnerabilities.
Some technical and managerial countermeasures that have been
recommended by Courtney [Bef. 3: pp. 40 -43, ], NB3 [Ref. 24:
pp. 9 - 12], and Shaiker [Ref. 25: p. 30,] as appropriate to
counteract the vulnerabilities of passwords are as follows.
• Password GeneratiDn and Selection - Passwords should be
comprised of a sufficient nunber of characters and gener-
ated in such a manner as to assure a degree of protection
commmensurate with the value of the assets. They should
be generated randomly, so that no association with a
particular user oan be detected. Bernan has suggested
that password generation be based on the concept of a
"virtual password" [Ref. 26: pp. 97-104]. The password
is created at the time -he user identifies himself or
herself to the system and is based on the user's identi-
fication number, social seourity number, and, in some
cases, the user's department number. Ref. 26 also
provides a sample algorithm that is suitable for gener-
ating a "virtual password."
• Password Distribution - Passwords for accessing the ADP
system should be distributed only to users meeting the
ADP system's need-to-know and need-to- utilize criteria.
The use cf a unique password by a user to access the the
ADP system, the application system, and the network is
endorsed by industry and is used by several command and
control ADP systens within the Navy. This hierarchy of
access requires that the urer be authenticated at the
system, application, and network levels. Each password
should be personally delivered to a user with instruc-
tions to memorize it, or it should be transmitted over a
secured communicat icn path tD the user. If the password
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is transmitted, then either the user should immedia tely
initiate a password change or, if impls aented, an auto-
matic password change routine should be invoked after
initial log- on.
Password Storage Protection - Passwords are usually
stored in a file located in nain memory. The file is
therefore vulnerable to tampering. To protect the pass-
word file, an appropriate countermeasure is to either
encrypt the file using the Data Encryption Standard (see
Ref. 27) or pass the file through a hard-to-invert trans-
formation algorithm. Tie algorithm ihould be
sufficiently difficult to prevent a code breaker from
successfully breaking the code with a reasonable amount
of time and resources.
• Password Usage Protection - Passwords entered via CRT or
printing terminals should be prevented from display by
masking the keyboard response. Additionally, a security
alarm or a terminal lookout should be generated automati-
cally after a specific nunber of unsuccessful aocess
attempts or a specific tine delay has elapsed since the
last aocess attempt. In order to uncover possible unau-
thorized usage of a password, it is suggested that each
user be shown a record of the most recent accesses under
his or her password upon log-on. To protect passwords
during a communications transmission, an appropriate
counter measure is to use either an encryption technique
or a protected con municat ions distribution system
[Ref. 10: p. F-39 ]. The system shouli also respond in
the same manner to a valid identification number and
invalid password, as it does to an invalid identification
number and invalid password. This prevents a user, who is
attempting an unauthorized izzqss, to know whether the
identification nunber is valid or not.
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• Password Lifetime - Passwords should be changed periodi-
cally, since the likelihood oE them being surreptitiously
discovered increases with tins. Also, if a password is
compromised or a user's access right is revoked, then the
password should be immediately invalidated.
2- Device Authentication
Besides authsi tica ting an authorized user, the ADP
system should be able to uniquely recognize devices that are
requesting services. This is particularly important when
evaluating the threats posed by remote or portable termi-
nals. An appropriate technical countermeasure is to require
each device to be equipped with circuitry which will respond
automatically to an interrogation command and transmi- an
identification code. This handshaking between the AD?
system and the remote device is accomplished either by an
exchange of identification codes or by the successful execu-
tion of a particular algorithm. The identification code,
also called a security code, should identify the particular
device and be unique within the system. This permits a
system-wide journal to maintain a log of accesses by device.
The device's circuitry should be protected in tamper-
resistant housing, and, if the amount of protection
warrants, the transmission should be protected by encryption
or a protected communications distribution system.
[Ref. 24: p.22]
If the system services devices which are not
directly connected, it should be capable of initiating a
call-back procedure that verifies the device's identity.
This call-back procedure makes use of a remote access list,
which must include device identification codes and a set of
authorized logical addresses or telephone numbers from which
each device can originate a request. Implementing either of
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these count ermeasures will enable the ADP system to guard
against an unauthorized devic= nasguerading as an authorized
one.
B. ACCESS CONTROL
Access control co untermeasi res enable properly identi-
fied users to access only thosa system resources for which
authorization has been granted. Traditionally, authoriza-
tion in conventional systems has meant that every system
element is automatically granted access to every other
system element, unless specifically prohibited. In
contrast, ADP systsms base authorization on the "least
privilege" principle, which states that a system element is
expressly prohibited from accessing another element, unless
authorization has beai explicitly granted. This principle
limits the damage that can result from error or malicious
attack and restricts the access of system elements to a
protective domain.
Before discussing the design considerations for access
control mechanisms, an explanation is reguired of what
constitutes a subject and an objsct. A subject is an active
entity in the ADP system that corresponds to a process or
task acting on behalf of a user or the operating system. An
object is either a software craated entity which represents
a collection of information (2.g., file, directory, or
program) or a hardware recognizable entity like a terminal
or special- purpose register. An access matrix conceptually
represents what subjects can access what objects and speci-
fies what access rights (read, write, delete, etc.) the
subjects have to the objects.
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1 • Access Control Desian Considerations
The design of acciss control mechanisms is based on
three considerations: [Ref. 28: pp. 192-217]
• Access Hierarchies, which automatically give privileged
subjects a superset of the access rights of nonprivil eged
subjects. Privileged subjects are those active entities
of a two-state machine that operate in the supervisor
domain. A subject operating in this domain has access to
all objects in the system, car. create and delete objects,
initiate and terminate user processes, and execute privi-
leged instructions not available to subjects operating in
the user domain (nonpri vilaged subjects). For example,
processes in the supervisor domain can change process
status words and Bxecute I/O instructions, while those in
the user domain can only request those services be
provided on their behalf.
• Authorization Lists, which associate with each object
those subjects which have aocess rights to it. These
lists are typically used to protect owned objects such as
files and data.
• Capabilities, which are like "tickets" for objects;
possession of a capability unconditionally authorizes the
holder access for all associated objects. In other
words, associated with each subject is a capabilities
list which specifies the sjbject's access rights to a
list of objects.
Access control can be segregated into several
levels: system, subsystem, file, record, or field, where the
subjects access rights are delineated at each level. With
an access control mechanism designed to mediate accesses
down to the field level, a greater likelihood exists of
detecting a violation or misuse of system resources.
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However, such a iesign significantly increases the n amber
and types of accesses to be verified and generally leads to
a degradation of system performance.
2- Access Control IHSl^Sillta tion
Access control counter neasures are implemented by
software routines which execate in the supervisor domain,
and are invoked by the file manager to grant or deny access
when symbolic references are made between subjects and
objects. As shown in Figure 4.1, the access control matrix
identifies all sabjects and objects in the system and
defines their relationship. If the matrix were directly
implemented, the tima reguired to validate an access request
could be unreasonable due to ths potentially large number of
empty spaces in the matrix.
Depending on the system software design, the access
control countermeasur e, which enforces the relationships
depicted in the matrix, can be implemented in different
ways. One approach is to organize and store the access
relationship from the subject's perspective, thereby elimi-
nating empty spaces in the matrix. This perspective, which
is called a capability-list orientation, maintains a capa-
bility list for each subject giving both the subject's
access rights and its related objects. The advantage of
this approach is that once the subject's capability list is
retrieved, the time required to validate subsequent access
requests is minimal. [Ref. 28: pp. 207-218, Ref. 29: p.
169]
A second approach is to organize and store the rela-
tionship from the object's perspective, where once again the
empty spaces are eliminated. This perspective, which is
called an authorization-list orientation, maintains with
each object a list of authorize! subjects and their respec-





























Figure '+ . 1 Access Control Matrix.
once an object has bsen requests!, further requests for the
same object can be rsadily processed. [Ref. 29: p. 169]
Each of ths ipproaches discussed above has a serious
maintenance problem. For example, when an object is removed
or a subject's access rights are changed, an exhaustive
search is needed to update all affected sntries. This is
very time consuming when using a list based strictly on
either capabilities d: authorizations. Rsf. 29 recommends
an authority-item approach to overcome this deficiency. The
approach is explained as a method for
organizing the a:c?ss control information into authority
items, each of which corresponds to a user (subject).
Furthermore, evary resource (object) in an authority
item is linked with the saur resources (objects) in
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other authority items. Tius, the authority item
approach supports capability lists directly and access
(authorization) lists indirectly through linkages. In
this way, search of authority items due to removal,
changes. and suspensions need not be exhaustive.
[Ref. 29: p. 170]
Regardless of the approached pursued, the overriding
consideration is to reduce the time neede3 to grant or deny
an access request and to provide a flexible mechanism that
can readily adapt to the dynamic interaction between
subjects and objects. For additional information on
different implementations of access control countermeasures,
the works by Stiegler (1979), Buttar (1930) and Gladney
(1975) are recommends! .
The implementation approaches presented above were
directed towards alternative design proposals for the access
control function. These same considerations apply equally
as well to the design of a data base management system since
it also is concerns! with ensuring that only authorized
users gain access to resources "Ref. 30: pp. 229-252].
C. SURVEILLANCE
The surveillance countemeasure detects and reacts
appropriately to any internal system activity that it has
determined may constitute a security threat. In order to
determine the source of this threat, the system must have a
means of achieving strict personal accountability for all
users (unique assignment of identification numbers). A
surveillance countemeasur e needs the capability to concur-
rently perform two functions: threat monitoring and
security auditing. For the count ermeasure to be effective,
the events to be itonitored aid legged must be approved
during the design of the ADP system and the capability
implemented prior to its operational use. The surveillance
countermeasure is usually implemented to operate in the
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privileged domain and, like all other system software,
requires protection from unauthorized modification, destruc-
tion, disclosure, or denial of service.
Threat monitoring is the real-time detection of a
successful or attempted penetration of the ADP system. The
threat monitor observes all user and system interactions to
ensure that the proper actios and responses are being
exchanged. If the monitor detects a security violation
(penetration attack), it must record the event and take some
automatic action, depending upon the severity and effect of
the violation. This action could range from printing a
security alert message on the operator's console to sounding
an alarm in the AOP Security Officer's location. In
designing the monitor, one must address what information, if
any, should be returned to the iser attempting to compromise
the system and what the disposition of the user's program
should be if execution had been initiated.
Security auditing concerns the logging, analyzing, and
reporting of security -related events, in particular, any
attempted or successful security violation. The logging
function collects and records in a historical file such
things as the user's identification nuitber and time of
log-on, the devices from which the user has entered
commands, programs, and files, and any other system data
unique to the particular user session (e.g., general regis-
ters, memory bounds, location of virtual memory table)
[Ref. 29: p. 166]. The logs are used to provide an audit
trail of system activity and to assist in the investigation
of recorded security violations.
Analyzing and reporting of security-related events is a
joint responsibility of the surveillance software counter-
measure and the ADP Security Officer. The countermeasur e is
normally designed to aaintain statistics on security-related
events and to prepare standardize reports on such events.
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while it is the ADP Security Officer that interprets these
products and takes appropriate ictions to correct the docu-
mented vulnerabilit ies . It is intended that a surveillance
countetmeas ure will act as an affective psychological deter-
rent to the user who night otherwise consider abusing his or
her privileges.
D. INTEGRITY
Integrity is the quality of protection that assures that
the ADP system works in a cohesive and predictable manner
regardless cf the operating conditions, that technical coun-
termeasures are effective ia maintaining the desired
security level, and that the ADP system is adequately
protected from the occurrence aid impact of errors [ Ref . 31:
pp. 15-17]. Count ermeasures for enforcing a system
integrity policy incLide controls for the internal (hardware
and software) system, processing, and system errors. The
technical countermea sures presented in the following
sections have been synopsized from Refs. 29, 32 and 33. The
listing is by no means exhaustive, rather it repesen-s
industry's judgement of the roost effective counter meas ures
for today's hardware and software. These countermeasures
are not usually identified explicitly as security mechan-
isms, but are often present for assuring a high degree of
system reliability.
1- Internal Sy_stem Controls
In today's mul tiprograaning and amltiprocessing ADP
systems, many users are concurrently sharing system
resources (memory, C?J, and I/O devices) and programs. The
multiplexing of these elements among many users has created
a need to isolate (s elf- protect) user programs from one
another, the system software, and the other system
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resources. This isolation of elements is achieved by
implementing various technical countermeasures that provide
for main memory protection, lual execution states, and
virtual machine monitors.
a. Main Memory Protection
Main memory protection concerns the ability to
protect partitions or portions of main memory from unwar-
ranted access by us=r programs. Main aemory is usually
divided into mutually exclusive areas thar are managed by
the system software. The systaa software loads these areas
with as many user programs as oan be efficiently serviced.
In previous generations, this meant bringing in a user
program, executing it for a period of time, suspending its
execution, and loading in anothsr user program. This swap-
ping continued usually via a round robin servicing scheme
until the user program had finished execution. This is no
longer judged as an efficient use of main asmory.
To overcome this inefficiency, a new architec-
ture developed which supports a virtual aemory capability.
The important characteristic of a virtual memory architec-
ture is that the address spice of a user program is
partitioned into a set of independently allocated units,
some of which are main memory resident during program execu-
tion, and some of wdich are not. With -his new approach,
the system software loads only units needed for execution,
hence a greater number of users can be serviced and memory
usage is more efficient. [ Ref . 32: pp. 32-33]
When the AD? systea does not permit concurrent
sharing of system resources or processes by multiple users,
the traditional main memory protection countermeasures of
base and bound registsrs or locks and keys are sufficient to
enforce an isolation policy. aemory base and bound regis-
ters are set by the system software to specify the valid
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upper and lower main memory addresses for the currently
executing process. Any attempt by the process to fetch from
or store to an aidrass outside these bounds generates an
interrrupt to the system software. When a different process
is brouqht in, the oase and bound registers are changed to
describe the new process 1 mercery area. A Lock and key coun-
termeasure is implemented by narking each location in main
memory with a lock and each program with a key. When the
user program is brought into lain memory for execution, the
system software compares the kef with the locks and unlocks
only those areas matched by th? program's key. Each fetch
and store is automatically examined by the hardware to
confirm that the key and lock natch.
When the ADP systen permits resource sharing,
these traditional countermeasures are not adequate because
they allow programs *ith different protection attributes to
concurrently access the same area of main memory. Ref. 29
recommends a solution to this problem that incorporates the
protection attributes and siz5 contraints in the address
translation table. This table is used by the system soft-
ware to map the virtual addresses of a user program into the
physical addresses needed in main memory. [Ref. 29: pp.
108-114]
Some additional countermeasures that are needed
to protect ADP systems which process sensitive business data
are as follows.
• Ability to scrub (zero out! residue from main and secon-
dary memory before reallocation to another user process.
• A memory write protection feature that prevents one
program from overwriting another. Any attempt to write
generates a systen interrupt.
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b. Dual Execution States
The duaL executioa states of privileged and
nonprivileged allow the ZPU to maintain the two execution
domains of supervisor and user. The system software
executes in the supervisor donain, thus it is permitted
immediate access to all systen resources, including the
ability to execute privilsged CPU and I/O instructions. On
the other hand, the user's process executes in the user
domain and any attempts to execute a privileged instruction
is automatically trapped by the CPU. Basically, this action
generates an interrupt which signals the CPU to cnange to
the privileged state and allows the system software to
execute the instruction on behaLf of the user process. This
countermeasure is available on almost all current ADP
systems.
c. Virtual Machine Monitors
The implementation of virtual machine monitors
allows each user program to have its own virtual machine
uniquely configured for its needs. The virtual monitor is
considered to be a functionally complete machine with i~s
own virtual CPU, meaory, I/D channels, devices, and any
other virtual resources requested. The only thing it lacks
to execute a user program is the physical CPU. The physical
CPU is allocated between virtual monitors, working a
specific amount of tine for each virtual CPU according to a
specified strategy. This allows for the time-multiplexing
of each virtual nonitor on the actual hardware and the
dynamic reconfiguration of the system to satisfy the needs
of a user program. Since each user process is contained in
a specifically configured virtual environment, any attempt
to access a systen resource oiitside that environment auto-
matically generates a system interrupt. Therefore virtual

machine monitors also contribute to an isolation (self
protection) security policy.
2- Processing ControLs
Processing controls it? mainly United to adminis-
trative countermeasures sued as standard operating
procedures and software engineering practices that indi-
rectly protect the ADP system and enhance the effectiveness
of the technical coun t ermeasures . Some of the controls that
should be considered as possible candidates are as follows.
• Users should be restricted to programming only in
higher-level languages.
• Modifications to system and application software should
be implemented by a two-person control strategy. Two
persons must sign off on all changes to the system soft-
ware before the changes are made in the operational
version.
• A Configuration Management PLan which addresses software
development and maintenance procedures should be
implemented.
• A Contingency Plan which describes the security proce-
dures for responding to abnormal operating conditions
should be established, published, and periodically
tested.
3« System Error Controls
System errors, also called failures, result in a
degraded or unknown performance level and can be caused by
hardware malfunctions, software errors, or operator errors.
Hardware malfunctions are caused by such things as the CPU,
memory parity, I/O interface and communication line, or
power failure. Software errors are concerned with both
operating and application systems deficiencies and are
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attributed to incomplete design specifications and/or imple-
mentation. And lastly, operator errors result from either
badly defined operating procedures or siaple human error.
[Ref. 33: pp. 104-105]
In developing cour.termeasures to protect against
these three types of errors, the designer must consider
error prevention, detection and recovery. Error prevention
is usually satisfied by providing sufficient redundancy so
that a component failure does not degrade performance.
Error detection requires the AD? system to be capable of
recognizing potential hardware and software malfunctions
before the entire system baits. Error recovery relates to
continuation of system functions after an error has occiired.
Recovery can be affected at several levels, depending upon
the severity and impact of the error. For example, if an
error could crash the system, tie recovery would be a system
restart; or if a program attempted to read past +-he er.d-of-
file, the recovery would entail an error message to the
user. Some counter n easu res that have been suggested by
Carroll [Ref. 20: pp. 265-237] and IRK Systems, Inc.
[Ref. 33: pp. 129-173] as effective in counteracting system
errors are:
• hierarchically designei fault- tolerant AD? systems
• redundancy of hardware and software components
• automatic backup hardware switchover
• transfer of critioal systen functions from software to
firmware or hardware
• dynamic checking of the system's operating state with
appropriate recovery actions specified should an illegal
state be detected
• capability for logical consistency checks (e.g., simulta-
nicus interrupt prevention, device address and existence
check, and time deck on propagation of signals between
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devices) with appropriate recovery actions initiated
should an inconsistency be realized
• capability for selective t =r mination, graceful degrada-
tion, automatic initiation of diagnostics, and graded
(warm/cold) restarts
• memory parity and addrsss validation
• replication of critical syststn files including data bases
and audit logs
• employment of data integrity controls such as: checks
for reasonableness, consistency, and range, use of
checksum totals aid parity daring data transfers, and
maintenance of a transaction journal
• timing and sequence checks pertinent to I/O operations




A. RECOMMENDED SPLICE FUNCTIONAL SECURITY MODULE
This section provides recommended design specifications
for a software Security .lodule to be incorporated into the
functional design of the SPLICE Local Area Network (LAN).
The specifications ace based upon the assumption that all
data handled within the 3PLICE LANs will be classified no
higher than Sensitive Business Data. The design specifica-
tions recommended ii this section satisfy the protection
reguireraents set forth in Refs. 10 and 11.
As discussed earlier, a complex data processing environ-
ment like SPLICE is usually protected by enforcing the four
ADP security policies of authentication, access control,
surveillance, and integrity. lie SPLICE Security Module has
been designed as a collection of submodules, with a recom-
mended software submodule fo~ each policy area except
integrity. The integrity requirements of SPLICE have
already been addressed in Ref. 13 and, if implemented, will
be adequate. The integrity requirements address such things
as memory protection features, change control procedures,
memory parity, data integrity controls, and system consis-
tency checks. Tha r ecommanded security mcdule is
specifically tailored to satisfy the security requirements
of the SPLICE LAN and should not be construed as being
endorsed for all such ea vironnents. The terms used to
describe the Security Module and its interactions with the




The functions of ths SPLICE Security Module are as
follows:
• Authentication of the user when accessing the SPLICE
Configur ation.
• Authentication of terminals and peripheral devices when
requesting or performing a service.
• Maintenance of an access control mechanism which enforces
the access rights as prescribed for subjects and objects
of the local SPLI3E Configuration and validates requests
for access to the SPLICE LAN and the Defence Data
Network.
• Maintenance of an online secarity auditing mechanism that
logs appropriate security related information required to
support subsequent analysis efforts.
1. Authentication
In order to enforce an authentication policy,
authorized use of SPLICE resources must be controlled by
both an administrative and a software ccuntermeasure. The
administrative ccuntermeasure requires that each user and
device be uniquely identifiable within the SPLICE LAN. The
software co untermeasur e necessitates the design of software
submodules which function to identify users, terminals, and
peripherals
.
Chapter IV presented in detail numerous mechanisms
considered effective in protecting a password authentication
count ermea sure. It is recommended that those mechanisms be
evaluated for their applicability to the detailed design of
the authentication sub module.
84

a. Authentication of Terminals and Users
The software submoiule for authenticating termi-
nals and users shouli be invoked by the Front End Processor
(FEP) Module when the user initially attempts to log on to
the local SPLICE Configuration (local system). It is
assumed that the FEP Module can recognize when a user is
logging on to the local system and that it can invoke the
submoduie when appropriate.
The terminal's identity should be checked by
reguiring the terminal to transmit a security code in
response to an interrogation command. The code is then
matched against a table of authorized terminal security
codes. If a match is found, the logon procedure continues.
Otherwise, the security auditing submoduie (to be addressed
later) is invoked and appropriate actions for responding to
a security violation are taken. After the terminal's iden-
tity is verified, the user's identification number and
password are checked in a similar manner. If a match is
found, the logon procedure is completed and control passed
back to the FEP Module. If no match is found, the security
auditing submoduie is invoked as before and control is
passed back to the F3P Module after appropriate actions have
been taken.
It is recommended that the authentication
submoduie for terminals and users be located in the same
physical machine as the FEP Module for each local system.
This recommendation is based on the need to restrict a
nonverified terminal and user to as little of -"rhe local
system as feasible. This subnodule will only be invoked
when a user (local, remote or satellite) initially logs on
to the local system.

b. Authentication of Peripherals
The authan tication submodule for verifying the
identity of a peripheral device has not been examined due to
the lack of detailed design specifications concerning how
the Peripheral Management (PS) Module interacts with the
local system. Once the design has been completed, it is
recommended that the countermeasures presented in Chapter IV
Section A. 2 be reviewed for their applicability.
2. Access Control
After the user's identity is verified, the FEP
Module forwards all subsequent user messages to the Terminal
Management (TM) Module. lie TM Module responds by
requesting that the Session Services (SS) Module establish
and maintain a user session. After a session has been
established, the SS Module examines each user request and
invokes the appropriate generalized functional module needed
for accomplishing the task requested. It is recommended
that the SS Module invoke the access control submodule to
validate the user's authorization rights before it invokes
any other functional nodule on behalf of the user.
The access control submodule should perform two
types of authorization control. First, if the user task
requests access to the SPLICE LAN or the Defense Data
Network, the access control subnodule should ensure that the
user has been authorized such an access. The second type of
control involves granting or denying a user (either local,
remote or satellite) access to a local system object such as
a file, directory, or peripheral device to perform some
action such as read, write or execute on that particular
object. If the request is not allowed, the security




The design of the accsss control submodule should be
based on the authority item technique presented in Ref. 29.
This design specification reduces the time required to grant
a user authorization request and allows authority items to
be easily modified when changes are made to the authoriza-
tion rights of a user (subject) or the access capabilities
of an object. The implementation of this countermea sure
requires that the authorization rights of users and access
capabilities of objects be explicitly defined and maintained
online for use by the access control submodule. It is
recommended that the accass control submodule be colocated




In order to enforce a surveillance policy, it is
recommended that a security auditing submodule be incorpo-
rated in the design of the SPLICE Security Module. No
particular location for this submodule is recommended, as it
could be a candidate for relocating from one physical
machine to another as necessary to improve the overall
performance of the 3PLICE Configuration. This submodule
will be invoked by the TM Module, the 55 Module, the PM
Module, and any other module which can recognize a security
violation or system error. Ihe appropriate actions for the
submodule to take when invoked are to log the event, to
notify the central system operator that an error or viola-
tion has occurred, and if the error or violation is severe
enough, the user's log-on or session should be terminated.
The security-related information recorded by this submodule
should include at a minimum trie following.
• A system access Log which identifies who accessed the
system, what terminal the aocess was made from, whether
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the access attempt was successful, and the date and time
it occurred.
• An input/output log which identifies who requested the
service, what function (read, write, enter, print) was
provided, whether the function was successful, and the
date and time it occurred.
• A processing log which records appropriate security-
related information about system errors and security
violations.
B. OTHER RECOMMENDED SPLICE SECURITY MEASURES
It is recommended that NAVSOPINST 5519. 6A be revised and
reissued to accomoflace the mininum mandatory counter measures
listed in Appendix J of Ref. 13, which was issued subsequent
to NAVSUPINST 5510. 6A. This would allow the mandatory coun-
termeasures to be included by reference in the next version
of the SPLICE Security and Risk Analysis Plan [Ref. 11].
The "SPLICE unbrella" contains many software products
which are being developed by Central Design Activities for
distribution to multiple activities. It is recommended that
the SPLICE Froject Officer insure that each software product
is certified in accordance with OPNAVINSI 5239. 1A prior to
distribution [Ref. 13: p. 3-1].
In the design of software products, the software
controls listed in Appendix I of Ref. 10 must be incorpo-
rated. It should also be notri that contractor developed
software and count=r measures are also subject to the
requirements of Ref. 10.
It is recommeded that the following actions be taken to
help insure that the risk in SPLICE is quantified and
managed at an acceptable level.
• A Network ADP Security Officer should be designated early
in the lifecycle of the SPLICE Project. The individual
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so designated should be givan a position high enough in
the project organization ana* appropriate authority and
resources to maaage the SPLI3E Risk Analysis Program and
effect the necessary design changes and operational
reguirements.
• The Network ADP Security Officer should develop and main-
tain a comprehensive checklist of threats which are
potentially present at any SPLICE activity. The reader
is invited to review the works of Martin (1973), N3S FIPS
31 (1974), Ref. 20, and Ref. 22 for recommended lists of
threats. The checklist should be made available to
activity risk analysis teams.
• The Network ADP Security Officer shouli be given cogni-
zance of all activity security incident reports [Ref. 10:
p. 8-2] in order to identify and monitor vulnerabilities
which potentially = xist in the SPLICE Network.
• A risk management training program should be established
to provide a consistent Risk Management Program
throughout the SPLICE Network. A list of responsibili-
ties for ADP security training is provided in Chapter 10
of Ref. 10.
• The appropriate Inspector 3eneral review program for
every SPLICE activity should incorporate a security
review, as defined in 0PN"!\VINST 5239. 1A [Ref. 10: p.
8-1 ].
C. FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
- Y.^ IMiliSI! 2t Security, loiule Specifications
This thesis provides a formal program for risk
management, but does not attempt to quantify the risk in any
particular activity. Additional research should be accom-
plished in at least one of ==veral ways. The risk of
operating can be estimated by simulating a "typical SPLICE
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activity." This would require complete enumeration of all
assets in the seven resource categories, and a listing of
all "potential" threats facing a SPLICE activity.
Another research method would be to examine an
existing Navy activity that is designated to become a SPLICE
activity. By evaluating the changes in the data processing
environment due to the SPLICE configuration, their impact on
the ADP security posture of the activity can be properly
examined.
By using one of these research methods, the recom-
mended Security Functional Module can be validated and, if
needed, additional co untermeasnres can be specified for in
the design of the SPLICE software or implemented at the
operational SPLICE activities.
2. Critigue of Risk Hanajsasnt Program
The Risk Management Program models presented in
Chapter 3 formalize the concepts proposed by Courtney
[Eef. 3], NBS [Ref. 17], and Fitzgerald [Ref. 19], and
adopted by the Navy in the DON ADP Security Program
[Ref. 10]. Although the models presented here reflect the
established concepts of tae various references, no attempt
has been made to analyze the validity of the concepts.
Both the Asset Loss Determination Model and the
Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation Model are essentially
exponential utility functions, which exhibit decreasing
marginal utility. Kith respect to asset losses, this
implies that an asset loss of $1,000 with a total asset loss
level of $10,000 is not as significant as an asset loss of
$1,000 when the asset loss level is at 3100,000. A simple
question arises in this reasoning. To a computer system
user, is the tenth day of doing without service less impor-
tant than the first or second? Likewise, is losing the use
of a tape drive less significant if you have already lost
90

five tape drives thai it is whaa you have lost none? There
may exist an argument that ths marginal utility should
increase with increasing asset Losses.
In threat and vulnerability evaluation, less signi-
ficance is similarly placed on narginal risk, as the activity
becomes more vulnerable cc mora threats are present. Is the
risk of a fourth or fifth attaok not as significant as the
second or third?
Finally, the Navy's risk management decision
problem should be more fully modeled. Currently explicit
constraints are plaoed on ths activity manager by the DAA
who sets a maximum aoceptable Total ALE. Although not docu-
mented in the Navy program, the setting of the maximum
acceptable Total ALE is done by use of the DAA's utility
function. Certainly this choioa is made in light of other
investment alternati/a s, and with regard to the Navy system





ADP Automatic Data Processing (See EDP)
ADPSO Automatic Data Processing Security
Of ficer
ADPSSO Aatomatic Data Processing System
Security Dfficer
ALE Annual Loss Expectancy
ARPANET Advanced Research Projec-s Agency
Network
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclical Redundancy Check
CRT Cathode Riy Tube
DAA Designated Approving Authority
DDN Defense Data Network
DES Data Encryption Standard
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
(National Bareau of Standards)
GAO General Accounting Office
I/O la put/output
IP Internet Protocol
IPLI Internet Private Line Interface













National Bureau of Standards
Network Security Officer
Dffice of Management and Budget
Stock Point Logistics Integrated
Communications Environment
Security Test and Evaluation







The majority Df the defiaitior.s contained herein are
taken from the Department of the Navy Automatic Data
Processing Security Program Manual, OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
[Ref- 10]- All definitions not from OPNAVINST 5239. U are
referenced.
ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK. A julicious and carefully consid-
ered assessment by the appropriate Designated Approving
Authority (DAA) that an automatic data processing (ADP)
activity or network meets the minimum requirements of appli-
cable security directives and the provisions of OPNAVINST
5239.1 A. The assessnent shouli take into account the value
of ADP assets; threats and vulnerabilities; countermeas ures
and their efficacy ii compensating for vulnerabilities; and
operational requirements.
ACCESS. The ability and the means to approach, communicate
with (input to or receive outpjt from), or otherwise make
use of any material or component in an ADP system.
Personnel only receiving computer output products from the
ADP system and not inputting to or otherwise interacting
with the system (i.e., no "hands on" or other direct input
or inquiry capabilityl are not considered to have ADP system
access and are accordingly not subject to the personnel
security requirements of OPNAVINST 5239.1 A. Such output
products, however, shall either be reviewed prior to dissem-
ination or otherwise determined to be properly identified as
to content and classification. * Ref . 35]
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ACCESS AUTHORIZATION. Password and/or user id required to
meet security restrictions for the resource being accessed.
[Ref. 13]
ACCREDITATION. A policy decision by the responsible DAA
resulting in a formal declaration that appropriate security
countermeasures have been properly implemented for the ADP
activity or network, so that the activity or network is
operating at an acceptable level of risk. The accreditation
should state the mode of operation and any operating limita-
tions applicable to the ADP activity or network.
ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY. The management constraints; opera-
tional, administrative, and accountability procedures; and
supplemental controls established to provide an acceptable
level of protection for data. Synonymous with procedural
security. [Ref. 3S]
ADP ACTIVITY. Any organizational entity with responsibili-
ties for developing, operating, or maintaining an ADP system
or network.
ADP SECURITY. Measires reguiced to protect against unau-
thorized (accidental or intentional) disclosure,
modification, or destruction of ADP systems and data, and
denial of service to process data. ADP security includes
consideration of all hardware/software functions, character-
istics, and/or features; operational procedures,
accountability procedures, and access controls at the
central computer facility, remote computer, and terminal
facilities; management constraints; physical structures and
devices; and personnel and communication controls needed to
provide an acceptable level of risk for the ADP system and
for the data or information contained in the system.
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ADP SECURITY STAFF. Individuals assigned and functioning as









,ty O c (TASO)
ystem Security Officer (OISSO)
Terminal Area Securit
Office Informatics S
ADP SYSTEM. An assembly of conputer equipment, facilities,
personnel, software, and procedures ccnfigured for the
purpose of classifying, sorting, calculating, computing,
summarizing, storing and retrieving data and information
with a minimum of iiman inters ention. An ADP system as
defined for purposes of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is the totality of
automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) and includes:
a. General and special purpose computers (e.g., digital,
analog, or hybrid computer equipment)
;
b. Commercially available components, these produced as a
result of research i nd development, and the equivalent
systems created frcm them, regardless of size, capacity, or
price, which are utilized in the creation, collection,
storage, processing, communication, display, or dissemina-
tion of data;
c. Auxiliary or accessorial equipment, such as data commu-
nications terminals, source data automation recording
equipment (e.g., optical character recognition equipment,
paper tape typewriters, magnetic tape cartridge typewriters,
and other data acquisition devices), data output equipment
(e.g. digital plotters and conputer output micrcf iimers)
,
etc., to be used in support of digital, analog, or hybrid
computer equipment, either cable-connected, wire-connected,
or self-standing;
d. Electrical accounting machines used in conjunction with
or independently of iigital, analog or hybrid computers; and
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e. Computer equipment which supports or is integral to a
weapons system. [Ref. 35]
ANNUAL LOSS EXPENTANCY (ALE). The ALE of an ADP system or
activity is the expected yearly dollar value loss from the
harm to the system or activity by attacks against its
assets.
ASSET. Any software, data, hardware, administrative, phys-
ical, comm unicatins, or personnel resource within an ADP
system or activity. See ADP RESOURCES.
ATTACK. The realization of a threat. How often a threat is
realized depends on such factors as the location, type, and
value of information being processed. Thus, short of moving
the system or facility or radically changing its mission,
there is usually no way that tie level of protection can
affect the frequency of attack. The exceptions to this are
certain human threats where effective security measures can
have a deterrent effect. The fact that an attack is made
does not necessarily n ean that it will succeed. The degree
of success depends on the vulnerability of the system or
activity and the effectiveness of existing count ermeasur es.
AUDIT. To conduct ths independent review and examination of
system records and activities ia order to test for adequacy
of system controls, to ensure compliance with established
policy and operational procedures, and to recommend any
indicated changes in controls, policy, or procedures.
a. Internal Security Audit. An audit conducted by
personnel responsible to the management of the orgainzation
being audited.
b. External Security Audit. An audit conducted by an




BROWSING. The act of searching through storage to locate or
acguire information without necessarily knowing the exis-
tence or the forma^ of the information being sought.
CENTRAL COMPUTER FACILITY. One or more computers with their
peripheral and storage units, central processing units, and
communications equipment in a single controlled area. This
does not include remote computer facilities, peripheral
devices, or terminals which are located outside the single
controlled area, even though they are connected to the
central computer facility by approved communication links.
[Ref. 37]
CENTRAL SYSTEM OPERATOR. A system user who by virtue of
security access control authorization has access to the user
mode and the central system operator moie of the command
interpreter. [Ref. 13]
COMHUNICATICNS SECURITY. The protection resulting from all
measures designed to den/ unauthorized persons information
of value which migit be derived from the possession and
study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized
persons in their interpretation of the results of such
possesion and study. Also called C0MS2C. Communications
security includes cry ptosecurit y, transmission security,
emission security, and physical security of communications
security materials and information.
CONFIGURATION MANA3E3ENT. The use of procedures appropriate
for controlling changes to a system's hardware and software
structure for the purpose of insuring that such changes will
not lead to decreased data security.
CONTINGENCY PLANS. A plan for emergency response, backup
operations, and post- disaster recovery maintained by an ADP
activity as a part of its security program. A comprehensive
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consistent statement Df all the actions (plan) to be taken
before, during, and after a disaster (emergency condition),
along with documented, tested procedures which, if followed,
will ensure the availability of critical ADP resources and
which will facilitate maintaining the contimuity of opera-
tions in an emergency situation.
CQUNTERMEASURE. See section II. A. 4.
DATA INTEGRITY. The state that exists when computerized
data is the same as that in the source documents and has not
been exposed to accidental or intentional modification,
disclosure, or destruction. *Ref. 36]
DATA LEVEL.
Level I. Classified lata.
Level II. Unclassified data requiring special protection;
for example, Privacy Act, For Dfficial Use Only, technical
documents restricted to limited distribution.
Level III. Ail other unclassified data.
DATA SECURITY. The protection of data from unauthorized
(accidental or intentional) aodificaiton, destruction, or
disclosure. [Ref. 35]
DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY (DAA) . An official assigned
responsibility to accredit ADP elements, activities, and
networks under the official's jurisdiction.
ESCORT(S). Duly designated personnel who have appropriate
clearances and access authorizations for the material
contained in the system and ar5 sufficiently knowledgeable
to understand the security inpiications Df and to control




HARDWARE SECURITY. Computer equipment features cr devices
used in an ADP system to preclude unauthorized accidental or
intentional modification, disclosure, or destruction of ADP
resources.
MATERIAL. "Material" refers to data processed, stored, or
used in and information generated by an ADP system regard-
less of form or medium, e.g., programs, reports, data sets
or files, records, and data elenents. [Ref. 35]
NEED-TO-KNOW. The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or
possession of certain information required to carry out
official duties. Res ponsibilit y for determining whether a
person's duties require that possession of or access to such
information and whether the individual is authorized to
receive it rests upon the individual having current posses-
sion, knowledge, or control of the information involved and
not upon the prospective recipient (s)
.
NETWORK. The int ecc onnectioa of two or more ADP central
computer facilities that provides for the transfer or
sharing of ADP resources. The ADP network consists of the
central computer facilities, the remote terminals, the
interconnecting comman icat ion links, the front-end proces-
sors, and the telecommunications systems.
OPERATING SYSTEM (D/S| . An integrated collection of service
routines for supervising the sequencing and processing of
programs by a computer. Operating systems control the allo-
cation of resources to a user and their programs and play a
central role in ensuring the secure operation of a computer
system. Operating systems may perform debugging, input-
output, accounting, resource allocation, compilation,
storage assignment tasks, and other "system" related func-
tions. Synonymous with terms such as "Monitor,"
"Executive," "Control Program," and "Supervisor." [Ref. 35]
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PASSWORD. A protested word du string of characters that
identifies cr authenti cates a user for access to a specific
resource such as a data set, file, or record.
PERSONAL DATA. Data abojt an individual including, but not
limited to, education, financial transactions, medical
history, gualif ication s, servioe data, criminal or employ-
ment history which ties the data to the individual's name,
or an identifying number, synbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or
voice print or a photograph.
PERSONNEL SECURITY. Tha procedures established to ensure
that each individual has a background which indicates a
level of assurance of trustworthiness which is commensurate
with the value of ADP resources which the individual will be
able to access.
PHYSICAL SECURITY. Piysical security is the protection of a
material entity (property) fron disruption of its safe and
secure state and is concerned with physical measures
designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized
access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents,
and to safeguard then against espionage, sabotage, damage,
and theft.
a. The use of locks, badges, and similar measures to
control access to the central computer facility.
b. The measures reqiired for the protection of the struc-
tures housing the central computer facility from damage by
accident, fire, environmental hazards, loss of utilities,
and unauthorized access.
REVIEW AND APPROVAL. The process whereby information
pertaining to the security and integrity of an ADP activity
or network is collected, analyzed, and submitted to the




RESOURCE-SHARING COMPUTER SYSTEH. A computer system which
uses its resources, including input/output (I/O) devices,
storage, central prDcessor (arithmetic and logic units),
control units, and software processing capabilities, to
enable one cr more users to manipulate data and to process
co-resident programs in an apparently simultaneous manner.
The term includes systems with one cr more capabilities
commonly referred to as timesharing, multiprogramming,
multi-accessing, mult i-processin g , or concurrent processing.
[Ref. 35]
RISK. See section II. A. 1.
RISK ANALYSIS (ASSESSMENT) . A. n. analysis of system assets
and vulnerabilities to establish an expected less from
certain events based on estimated probabilities of the
occurrence of these svents. Tie purpose of a risk assess-
ment is to determine if count armeasures are adequate to
reduce the probability of loss or the impact of loss to an
acceptable level.
SECURITY ACCESS CONSTRAINTS. The process and file access
restrictions imposed by tha security requirements.
[Ref. 13]
SECURITY FILE. File containing user ids and associated
access constraints. [Ref. 13]
SECURITY LOG. Data file containing violations of the
security requirements. [Ref. 13]
SECURITY OFFICER. Designated individual who is responsible
for maintaining the security procedures for the
installation. [Ref. 13]
SECURITY INSPECTION. An examination of an ADP system to




SECURITY SPECIFICATIONS. A detailed inscription of the
countermeasures required to protect an ADP activity or
network from unauthorized (accidental or intentional)
disclosure, modification, and destruction of data, or denial
of service.
SECURITY TEST AND EVALUATION (STSE). An examination and
analysis of the security features of an ADP activity or
network as they have been applied in an operational environ-
ment to determine ths security posture of the activity or
network upon which an accreditation can be based.
SECURITY VIOLATION. Any attempt to gain access to the oper-
ating system, the operating system files and executable
modules, or systen user files and executable modules.
[Ref. 13]
SENSITIVE BUSINESS DATA. Data which requires protection
under Title 18, USC 1905, and other data which by its nature
requires controlled distribution or access for reasons other
than the fact that it is classified or personal data.
Sensitive Business Data is rscognized in the following
categories
:
a. For Official Use Only--Re guiring confidentiality of
information derived from InspectDr General, authority, or
other investigative activity.
b. Financi al--Reguirir.g protection to ensure the integrity
of funds or other fiscal assets.
c. Sensitive Manage n ent--Regui ring protection to defend
against the loss of property, material, or supplies or to




RegiLring protection to protect data or
information in conformance with a limited rights agreement
or which is the exclusive property of a civilian corporation
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or individual and which is on loan to the Government for
evaluation or for its proper us = in adjudicating contracts.
e. Privileged—Requiring protection for conformance with
business standards or as required by law. (Example:
Government- developed information involving the award of a
contract.)
SPLICE CONFIGURATION. An integrated set of six hardware/
software systems rs- quired to achieve the functional,
performance and capacity requirements of the SPLICE
specifications. [Ref. 13]
SPLICE LOCATION. One or more SPLICE configurations in the
same geographical area (on the same Local Computer Network)
connected to Governman t-furnishsd equipment and interfaces.
[Ref. 13]
SPLICE NETWORK, Provides the connectivity between geograph-
ically distant SPLICE locations. Government furnished data
communications lines shall connect the locations through
common carrier lines and/or through a Government-furnished
network. [ Ref. 13
]
THREAT. See section II. A. 2.
USER. k person oc organization receiving products or
services produced by a ADP system either by access to the
system or by other mains.
USER ID. Data elament input to identify a system user and
to label processing products resulting from the user-
initiated processing. [Ref. 13]





This Appendix prDvides a short summary of the Defense
Data Network (DDN) . The source document used is the Defense
Da^a Network Program Plan revised May 1982 [ Ref . 38].
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The DDN will be an integrated packet-switching data
network designed to satisfy all DOD data networks require-
ments projections through the 1990's. The DDN will take
advantage of existing networks, notably the WWMCCS
Intercomputer Network (rfIN) and the Advanced Research-
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), and will be based










ccmponents to be used in the DDN.
There will be 171 switching nodes located at about 85
widely distributed sites. The switching node is a Bolt
Baranek and Newman (B3N) C/30, a microprogrammed
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minicomputer costing about $45,000 (including TEMPEST/HEMP
protection) . The r/30 is designed for unattended opera-
tions. All switching nodes will be located on military
facilities and secured to at lsast the SECRET level. The
network will have a principle System Monitoring Center
(SMC), an alternate SMC, regional Monitoring Centers (MCs)
in Europe and the Pacific, and MCs for each separate
community.
The DDN provides for increased survivability in several
ways. The 171 fixed switching nodes and 9 fixed MCs will
have HEMP protection (EM shielding, line isolation, and
surge arresting protection). Sites with no backup power
will be provided in interrupt! ble power supplies (UPS).
There will be five preposit ionei mobile reconstruction nodes
equipped with MC capability. A dynamically adaptive routing
algorithm will automatically r:ite traffic around congested,
damaged, or destroyed switches and trunks. Additionally, a
dense trunk in g grid will provide redundancy at all possible
points in the network..
There will be at Least 99£ availability between any pair
of singie-h cmed users. Critical subscribers will be dual-
homed (a single aooess line to t wo switching nodes),
providing at least 99.5% availability. Dual access lines to
a single node can also be usei.
Precedence levels can be assigned by originating hosts
and terminals, and will be used in the allocation of network
resources. Switching nodes provide for four levels of
precedence, with preemption of lower precedence communica-
tions. Category I (FLASH and FL ASH-OVERRIDE) communications
will be processed in non-blocting mode exclusive of all
other traffic modes and volumes.
Communications errors will be minimized by the use of
error detection and correction mechanisms. A Cyclical
Redundancy Check <C RCt of 15 bits is associated with host
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messages on the access lines aa3 packets on trunks. A 32
bit CRC is used with S IP-compatible hosts. Additionally, 16
bit checksums are provided on aa end-to-end basis within the
switch subnetwork and on a user-to-user basis via the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Error detection and
correction hardware is used in the switches for protecting
against memory failures and for checksumming of critical
data structures and portions of code.
B. SPECIFIC DDN HARD* ARE/SOFTW&RE
1- Switching Nods
The BBN C/3 packet switching processor is a multi-
board, microprograimed miniconputer , with 61k words of
random access memory (RAM) , which supports a full range of
synchronous and asynchronous 1/3 interfaces. The C/30 soft-
ware is the ARPANET Interface Message Processor (IMP)
program which can be loaded locally (from a cassette) or
downline loaded fron a MC. The software provides the
following functional c apabilitiss:
• Store and forward traffic processing.
• Hos- access and end-to-end traffic processing (with a
variety of host access protocols, see p. 33 of Eef. 38).
• Dynamic, adaptive, distributed routing which measures
actual packet delays and routes individual packets along
the least delay pith.
• Monitoring and control services.
2- Internet Private Line Interface
The Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI) is a
security device, currently under development as part of the
Gray Tree program, which will be used for end-to-end encryp-
tion. It is composed of three functional units: a KG 84
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cryptographic device and two MC58000 based packet processors
(one on each side of the Kj 3U). Figure C. 1 shows the
placement of the IPLI with each host for snd-to-end encryp-
tion on the DDN. The software in each processor will be
based on the CMOS operating system, with the basic functions
necessary for the DDD standard internet environment and
monitoring and centre! functions. The protocol interfaces
conform to the DOD Standard Internet Protocol (IP). Since
the packet processing occurs at the lower level of the IP,
the TCP and other protocols which exist above the IP can be
supported.
Exclusive of the KG 84 , the estimated unit cost for
production IPLIs (after FY84) in lots of 100 or more is
$15,000.
3. Minl^TAC
A mini-TAC is a terminal access device that allows a
cluster of up to 1 6 synchronous and asynchronous terminals
access to the network. It is logically equivalent to a
network host and will use the sane host-host protocols. The
ARPANET- bas ed mini-TA3 software allows a terminal to connect
to hosts on the network. The aini-TAC software multiplexes
all the terminal-hose connections over a single link between
it and the switching node. Since Miai-TACs will not
initially provide dial-up access, access will be over hard-
wired lines and controlled by physical access control
measures.
The mini-TAC will be constructed around a Motorola
MC68000 microprocessor with nemory, 15 synchronous or
asynchronous terminal ports, and multiple network interface
ports (to allow d ji 1-homin g) . The mini-TAC will meet
TEMPEST and HEMP requirements. Mini-TACs will communicate
with other network hosts using DOD standard TCP and IP.










HOST 2 PLI 2 Hfc
I I
G8U
Figure C- 1 End-to-end Encryption.
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The mini-TAC will be assigned for unattended opera-
tions. Control functions and hardware ani software fault
diagnosis can be dons remotely from a Monitoring Center.
Repair will be by board swapping. In quantities of 100, the
production cost per unit is estimated at $7500 plus $250 per
port.
C. SECURITY FEATDRES
1 • Link Encryption
The K3 84 crypto devise will be used on all back
bone trunks, on all access lines to classified hosts, and on
access lines to sites that act as MCs for the unclassified
community. Because all hosts will use the IPLI described
above, communications on the trunks will be "super
encrypted." The link encryption will conceal traffic
patterns and monitoring reports, which might yield traffic
analysis information. It also protects MC-switch control
traffic, which is important since this traffic includes
downline loading of sensitive switch software.
2- Security Level Separation.
Separation of subscribers operating at different
system high levels is provided by the use of IPLIs (at least
one IPLI key for each different system high level) , creating
at least one logical subnet for each security level. Since
IP and subnet headers must bs in the clear for packet
processing within the switch, all switches are TEMPEST
enclosed and in military facilities secured to at least the
SECRET level. Establishment of logical subnets will guar-
antee against delivery of communications to any subscriber
outside the subnet. This guarantee against misdelivery will
be used to protect statistical reports from being delivered
to any hosts other than an MC. Each MC and the fake host in
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each switch that comnu nicates with the MC will be members of
the logical subnet. additionally, only the SMC can retrieve
and accumulate traffic statistics.
3« Separation of Communities of Interest
Communities of interest are subscriber groups which
present an acceptable level de risk to each other and
reguire a high level of interoperability. Separation of
communities of interest is accomplished through the creation
of logical subnets oy cryptographic means, by software
control, or both. For unclassified subscribers, the
switches provide the ability to define logical subnets which
restrict traffic to flow only among the members cf that
logical subnet. The number of subnets provided by the
switches is currently limited to 16, but can be increased to
32 or 64.
Classified user communities will be separated by
IPLI subnets (like-keyed IPLIs) . Current policy limits IPLI
separated communities of interest to 128 subscribers.
y « Individual Access Control
Access control to subscriber facilities is the
responsibility of the subscribers themselves. The network
will assure that access of one subscriber to another is
controlled with respect to authorized security level and
community of interest, but will not verify that an iniivi-
dual user (person or process) has valid access rights to
that subscriber.
5- Personnel Clearances and Ke_ys
All personnel with ^.zcbss to switches must be
cleared to the SECRET level 3ue to the traffic analysis
potential. This clearance level also applies to all
personnel at the MCs. Personnel manning an MC for a secure
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subnet must be cleared to ths Level of the subnet subscri-
bers. Crypto technicians wilL be required for keying the
IPLIs for each community and for link K3s. The keying
material for each IPLI community is available only at the
IPLI sites. The keying naterial for the link KGs is avail-
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